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 Over the last half-century, the United States has experienced a tax revolution at the local 
level of government.  Driven by preferences of many residents to limit the size and growth of 
local government, the tax revolts have spread rapidly since the installment of Proposition 13 in 
the state of California in the late 1970s.  Today, tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), such as 
property tax limits, have been implemented in the vast majority of states for a variety of reasons.  
This expansion in the use of TELs has raised three main questions among economists.  First, why 
are TELs implemented to begin with?  Second, do TELs achieve the objectives that they have 
been set out to accomplish?  Lastly, are there any consequences or adverse effects of the 
implementation of TELs? 
In this study, I shed light on each of these three questions with a primary focus on the use 
of county-level property tax assessment caps in the state of Maryland.  The “Homestead Property 
Tax Credit” was reformed in Maryland in 1992 to allow each county-level government the right 
to set an assessment cap associated with owner-occupied property tax bills at any magnitude 
between zero and ten percent.  This unique structure of the property tax allows for the empirical 
examination of the choice of magnitude of assessment caps in Essay 1 to further understand 
those characteristics associated with preferences for varying levels of residential property tax 
relief.  Results suggest that substitutability among revenue sources and shocks to the housing 
market play a key role in the preferences for such tax relief. 
In Essay 2, I examine an important consequence associated with targeted tax relief by 
empirically investigating shifts in the relative burden of the property tax.  Results indicate that 
jurisdictions associated with preferences for higher levels of residential property tax relief may 
increase the level and share of non-residential property tax levies, shifting the relative burden of 
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the property tax from homeowners to businesses.  The results in each of these two essays provide 
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Since the late 1970s, state and local governments in the United States (U.S.) have 
implemented various tax and expenditure limitations (TELs).  The most common form of TELs 
used in the U.S. are property tax limits, which can theoretically be used to provide insurance 
against rapidly increasing property tax bills (Anderson 2006).  Depending on the level of 
property tax relief chosen, public services could be compromised if revenue substitution does not 
help to maintain government spending after property tax limits have been installed.  In this study, 
I establish an understanding of the choice of magnitude of property tax relief using panel data to 
examine the role that various factors play in the level of property tax assessment caps and 
property tax rates chosen by Maryland county governments.  Since caps and rates do not fully 
explain whether or not property tax relief is binding, I also study which factors affect the extend 
to which property tax relief is binding – that is, whether the assessment cap is actually providing 
property tax relief to homeowners rather than simply acting as a nominal artifact of the local tax 
structure. 
Maryland‟s assessment caps give county governments the right to determine the 
magnitude of local property tax relief, providing a natural setting to analyze these questions 
empirically.  While prior studies have only examined the existence of property tax relief, this is 
the first study to analyze the way in which fiscal parameters, shocks to the housing market, and 
demographic characteristics affect the choice of magnitude of property tax relief.  This is also the 
first study to provide empirical evidence supporting Anderson‟s (2006) insurance idea that 
suggests voters may care to maintain current levels of local public goods and services while 
simultaneously establishing a safety net against uncontrollable increases in owner-occupied 
 3 
property tax bills by installing targeted property tax relief to homeowners only.  Results indicate 
that revenue substitution effects are present to help maintain levels of government spending in 
light of property tax limitation mechanisms and housing market shocks affect the extent to which 
residential property tax relief is binding. 
 
1.B Introduction 
 In 1976, House Bill 920 was passed in the state of Ohio, effectively restricting the 
amount of property taxes collected by Ohio‟s state and local government entities.  Soon 
thereafter, California‟s implementation of Proposition 13 further triggered an assortment of 
comparable “tax revolts” that spread throughout the country.  During the 1970s and 1980s, these 
tax revolts developed through the endorsement of various “tax and expenditure limitations” 
(TELs), originally designed to limit increases in revenues and expenditures that were caused by 
rapidly increasing property values (Hill et al. 2006).  By 2002, all but four states had some 
version of a limitation on taxes or expenditures in place, either at the state or local level 
(National Conference of State Legislatures 2002). 
 As the popularity of TELs has increased, it is not surprising that a plethora of research 
has evolved to provide insight regarding why TELs are implemented to begin with, how TELs 
are installed, the effects of TELs on state and local government finances, structural modifications 
of state and local governments associated with TELs, and indirect effects of TELs.  Implications 
of the existence of TELs have been found to range from limited revenues and expenditures 
(Preston and Ichniowski 1991, Shadbegian 1998) to declining student test scores (Figlio 1997) 
and even to declining home values (Bradbury et al. 2001).  TELs can be voted for or against on a 
ballot or they can be imposed by elected government officials and depending upon the 
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jurisdiction, some TELs can even be overridden by local residents.  Though the extent to which 
consequences of TELs transpire is not clear for each specific installment, all TELs provide 
researchers with a unique chance to study the effects of the choice to impose a constraint on state 
or local governments in a natural setting. 
In this study, I focus on why TELs are implemented with a different approach compared 
to the prior literature.  Instead of simply measuring the choice to implement a TEL, I measure the 
choice of magnitude of TELs using property tax assessment caps in Maryland.  Prior research 
only considers the existence of TELs, which would be the equivalent of only considering the 
existence of a particular tax without bearing in mind the magnitude of that tax or its base/rate 
structure.  Concentrating on the magnitude of TELs allows me to focus on the characteristics 
associated with citizens who prefer more tax relief and compare the results to characteristics of 
those citizens who prefer less relief.  Presumably, voters consider the magnitude of property tax 
relief keeping in mind that local public goods and services may be cut accordingly. 
I chose Maryland for my analysis because the structure of property tax assessment caps in 
Maryland provides a unique within-state laboratory to analyze the choice of magnitude of 
property tax relief.  Beginning in 1992, the state of Maryland established the “Homestead 
Property Tax Credit,” which caps the annual growth in taxable assessed value of each residential 
property at ten percent statewide.
1
  In addition, the state government grants each county 
government the right to annually determine their own assessment cap at the magnitude of their 
choice as long as the caps are installed between zero percent and ten percent.  Data provided by 
the Maryland State Department of Assessments and Taxation (SDAT) indicate that assessment 
                                                          
1
 Because the Homestead Property Tax Credit is equivalent to a property tax assessment cap, I refer to the credit as 
an “assessment cap” throughout this study. 
 5 
caps have varied by county and by year since they were first implemented in the early 1990s.  
This variation allows for the opportunity to empirically examine the choice of magnitude of 
property tax relief made by county-level governments in Maryland. 
I begin by empirically analyzing the role that various factors play in the choice of 
magnitude of property tax relief using a balanced panel of county-level data in Maryland over 
the years 1996 to 2006.
2
  Since property tax rates represent a choice variable that is closely 
related to the choice of TEL magnitude, I first model the joint decision of the magnitude of the 
assessment caps and these rates.  Overall, results indicate that counties with higher levels of local 
taxes other than the property tax are associated with higher levels of property tax relief, 
suggesting that these counties turn to other revenue sources to make up for any lost revenue from 
property tax limits.  Additionally, counties with a greater increase in the growth of residential 
properties are associated with increased residential property tax relief, suggesting that shocks to 
the housing market play a role in the choice of magnitude of property tax relief. 
Other noteworthy results relate to demographic characteristics of the population.  
Counties with a higher share of the population enrolled in k-12 public schools are associated 
with preferences for less property tax relief via assessment caps, likely because these residents 
prefer sufficient funding of local public services such as education.  On the other hand, counties 
with a higher share of the population aged 65 years and older are sometimes found to be 
associated with preferences for more property tax relief via assessment caps.  This is likely 
because these residents gain fewer direct benefits from public education. 
                                                          
2
 The only prior study to consider the magnitude of TELs is Shadbegian (1999).  See the literature review for more 
on this study.  
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To further understand the factors that affect the magnitude of property tax relief chosen, I 
also examine the possibility that counties engage in strategic interactions – either yardstick 
competition or tax base competition – in determining each of the choice variables listed above 
(see the discussion below to understand the difference between yardstick competition and tax 
base competition).  In the context of this study, yardstick competition refers to voters in the home 
county taking into account neighboring counties‟ choice variables such as property tax 
assessment caps and property tax rates when determining their own magnitudes of these 
variables.  Most research regarding TELs lacks any consideration of these spatial effects.  
Results from this study indicate that strategic interactions may exist in determining the 
magnitude of property tax rates, though it appears that there are no neighboring effects in the 
choice of magnitude of the assessment caps. 
Lastly, I empirically investigate which factors affect the extent to which property tax 
relief is binding in a given county based on the share of homeowners receiving residential 
property tax relief.  Binding TELs may have greater implications for tax burdens and for the 
provision of local public services, so these models further consider the choice of magnitude of 
the assessment caps in Maryland counties.  Since non-binding assessment caps may do nothing 
to change government behavior and should not be weighted equally to binding caps, this exercise 
sheds light on the characteristics associated with property tax relief that actually exists.  Results 
from these models indicate that counties with higher growth in residential properties and a higher 
share of the population aged 65 years and older are associated with a greater share of recipients 
of property tax relief.  In addition, spatial models indicate that counties with neighboring 
 7 
jurisdictions granting relatively larger shares of homeowners with property tax relief are more 
likely to grant property tax relief to homeowners in the home county. 
In addition to the contributions noted above, this study avoids several shortcomings that 
exist in the prior literature.  By giving county governments in Maryland the choice to set their 
own assessment caps, I can analyze the choice of magnitude of property tax relief without 
suffering from shortcomings in previous within-state studies on TELs, which typically consider a 
statewide tax limit that lacks a counterexample.  This shortcoming in much of the prior literature 
results in an insufficient understanding of how policies would have been affected in the absence 
of property tax limits (Dye and McGuire 1997).  I am also able to avoid a common drawback 
among cross-state examinations of TELs, which cannot control for various differences in state 
and local government institutional characteristics (Dye and McGuire 1997).  Since my panel 
reflects the entire population of Maryland counties, I minimize a significant portion of the 
ambiguity with regards to variation in government structure. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  First, I provide background 
information on property tax limits in Maryland with a particular focus on assessment caps.  A 
review of the pertinent literature is followed by the conceptual framework and an explanation of 
the empirical strategy.  Lastly, I outline the empirical results, provide a general discussion of the 
results, and summarize the importance of the findings in this study. 
 
1.C Motivation 
 Over the past quarter-century, TELs have spread across the U.S., most commonly in the 
form of property tax limits.  Sparked primarily by California‟s Proposition 13, a variety of 
 8 
property tax limits have since evolved, including property tax rate limits, assessment limits, 
revenue rollbacks, expenditure limits, and circuit breakers.
3
  In this section, I introduce 
Maryland‟s property tax limits.  This background information will pave the way for the review of 
the pertinent literature and the statistical analysis that follows. 
Assessment Caps in Maryland 
 The main property tax limit of interest in this study comes in the form of an assessment 
limit (often referred to as an assessment cap), which simply limits the growth of a property‟s 
taxable assessed value.  Property tax assessment caps may prevent significant increases in tax 
bills when property values are growing at a rapid pace.  Maryland has both a state-level and 
local-level residential property tax.  Assessment caps in Maryland were developed in 1977 when 
the state legislature passed a law requiring that any annual increase in assessed value of 
residential property over fifteen percent was effectively untaxed.  Since the program technically 
reduced a homeowner‟s state-level property tax bill by providing a tax credit equal to the product 
of the statewide property tax rate and the amount of the assessed value in excess of the taxable 
assessed value, this ruling was titled the “Homestead Property Tax Credit.”  Though labeled a 
credit, the program was equivalent to a property tax assessment cap.  The assessment caps were 
not – and still are not – coupled with a property tax rate limit.  According to the Maryland SDAT 
(2008), the assessment caps were passed with the intention of limiting taxation of large annual 
assessment increases on owner-occupied property.
4
 
                                                          
3
 For a detailed description of property tax limits and further discussion regarding their consequences, see the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (2002).  Other relevant studies include Hill et al. (2006), Brome and Saas 
(2006), Mullins and Wallin (2004), Baer (2003), and Preston and Ichniowski (1991). 
4
 Through direct correspondence with SDAT, I was given information regarding institutional characteristics and 
reassessment processes in Maryland, along with unique data for the empirical analysis. 
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 Some considerable modifications were made to the Homestead Property Tax Credit 
program in the early 1990s, all of which remain in place today.  Beginning in 1992, Maryland‟s 
Homestead Property Tax Credit was reformed so that any annual assessment increase for a 
residential home that is greater than ten percent is effectively not taxable at the state level.  The 
state of Maryland also granted each county-level government the right to set their own 
assessment cap below the statewide level of ten percent for county-level property taxes.  In fact, 
county governments are allowed to set their assessment cap as low as zero percent as long as the 
assessment cap chosen is in increments of one percentage point between zero and ten percent.  
These local caps are the main focus of the analysis in this study. 
Table 1.1 presents an example of the impacts of the Homestead Property Tax Credit on 
an individual property tax bill in 2007 under three different levels of property tax relief (three 
different assessment caps) holding the property tax rate constant.
5
  For each assessment cap in 
the table (ten percent, five percent, and zero percent), I assume that the assessed value of an 
individual‟s nominal owner-occupied property increased from $221,103 in 2004 to $315,000 in 
2007 – a 42.47 percent nominal increase.
6
  These figures represent the actual statewide median 
home sales prices for Maryland in 2004 and 2007 (Maryland SDAT 2008). 
The SDAT uses a phase-in method to calculate assessed values.  That is, they take the 
change in assessed value from 2004 to 2007 (in this case $93,897) and divide it by three to get an 
average annual change in assessed value of $31,299.  Therefore, the assessed value in 2007 is the 
                                                          
5
 All tables and figures are located at the end of this chapter in the Appendix.  In Table 1.1, I assume a property tax 
rate of 0.9690 percent (or $0.9690 per $100 of assessed value), which represents the average county-level property 
tax rate in Maryland in 2007 (Maryland SDAT 2008). 
6
 In Maryland, the SDAT is in charge of reassessing all homes.  The state performs reassessments for each unit of 
owner-occupied property once every three years.  Therefore, approximately one-third of all homes are reassessed in 
a given county each year.  Only primary residences are allowed to receive property tax relief via assessment caps. 
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assessed value in 2004 ($221,103) plus $31,299, which is equal to $252,402.
7
  If there were no 
assessment cap in place, this $252,402 would also be the taxable assessed value in 2007 and the 
property tax bill would simply be the property tax rate multiplied by this value ($2,446).  
Therefore, with no assessment cap installed, the tax liability is equivalent across all three 
columns in Table 1.1. 
With an assessment cap installed, however, the taxable assessed values change depending 
on the magnitude of property tax relief provided by the caps.  Under a scenario with a ten percent 
assessment cap, since the average annual change in assessed value is 14.16 percent (or one-third 
of the 42.47 percent overall change), this assessment cap is “binding” – that is, it will provide 
property tax relief to the homeowner.
8
  The existence of the assessment cap results in a taxable 
assessed value of only $243,213, which is $9,189 below the taxable assessed value with no 
property tax relief in place.  Therefore, the tax credit is equal to the product of the property tax 
rate and the amount over the taxable assessed value with the cap installed.  This results in a 
property tax bill of $2,357, which is $89 lower than the property tax bill with no assessment cap 
in place. 
Assuming a fixed property tax rate, as the assessment cap declines across columns in 
Table 1.1, the tax liability also declines, resulting in more property tax relief.  If the same 
homeowner were located in a county with a five percent assessment cap, a tax credit of $196 
would be provided, resulting in a tax liability of only $2,250.  Similarly, if this homeowner were 
                                                          
7
 Similarly, the assessed value in 2008 would be $252,402 plus $31,299 (or $283,701) and the assessed value in 
2009 would be $283,701 plus $31,299 (or $315,000).  The assessed value in 2010 (a reassessment year) would be 
$315,000 plus one-third of the change in assessed value from 2007 to 2010. 
8
 For the purposes of this study, an assessment cap is binding if it is less than the nominal annual growth in assessed 
value. 
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located in a county with a zero percent assessment cap, a tax credit of $303 would be provided, 
resulting in a tax liability of only $2,142. 
As illustrated in Table 1.2, there exists considerable variation across counties and over 
time in the magnitude of assessment caps.  In 1992, the first year in which counties were able to 
implement an assessment cap, the average county-level cap equaled 8.50 percent and only six 
county governments (out of Maryland‟s twenty-four) chose an assessment cap less than ten 
percent.  By 2000, the average county-level assessment cap dropped to 7.71 percent and nine 
counties had assessment caps less than ten percent.  Finally, in 2008 the average county-level 
assessment cap equaled 5.92 percent with nineteen counties choosing a cap less than ten percent.  
Only four counties that began with a cap equal to ten percent in 1992 remained at ten percent in 
2008. 
The process and timing whereby county governments determine the magnitude of their 
assessment caps plays a key role in this study, especially for the structure of the empirical 
estimation.
9
  All Maryland counties follow the same fiscal year – July 1 through June 30.  
Beginning on July 1, the Maryland SDAT begins the assessment process for the new fiscal year.  
During October, the SDAT provides each county-level finance and budget office with 
preliminary numbers representing the residential assessable tax base according to the properties 
that have been assessed from July 1 through the end of September to give each county 
government some indication of the trends in assessed values at the beginning of the current fiscal 
year.  By November 1, each county-level government chooses the magnitude of their assessment 
cap that will be applied to the current fiscal year.  Later in the fiscal year (typically sometime in 
                                                          
9
 Information regarding the timing of the assessment cap was provided by Mr. Robert Young, Associate Director of 
the Maryland SDAT. 
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May), county officials set the property tax rate that will generate the community‟s preferred level 
of property tax revenue. 
Other Property Tax Limits in Maryland 
It is important to note that the use of a single property tax limit alone may not guarantee 
property tax relief.  For example, either property tax rate limits or property tax assessment caps 
alone will not be able to achieve the goal of providing property tax relief since rapidly-increasing 
property values may result in considerable increases in property tax bills when the tax rate is held 
constant.
10
  Therefore, it is not uncommon for government entities to use more than one property 
tax limit in harmony to achieve the objectives of providing property tax relief.  Combining policy 
instruments can assure homeowners experiencing rapid changes in assessed values of some 
property tax relief. 
A few Maryland counties have implemented property tax revenue caps, which limit the 
level or growth in property tax revenue to a fixed percentage that is often chosen to equal the 
growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  Beginning in 1992, only two counties in Maryland 
(Anne Arundel and Montgomery) had revenue caps installed.  Currently, four counties in 
Maryland impose direct limits on property tax revenues – all of which impose restrictions on the 
growth of property tax revenues.  These revenue caps are important to examine for two reasons.  
First, they may be installed for different reasons than assessment caps, which would necessitate 
further investigation of their presence.  For example, property tax revenue caps often provide 
relief to all property taxpayers, including non-residential property owners who may not receive 
                                                          
10
 For instance, if a home is assessed at $100,000 in the current period at a property tax rate of one percent, this 
homeowner‟s property tax bill is $1,000.  Assuming that this same homeowner experiences an increase in assessed 
value of $25,000, the assessed value in the second period is equal to $125,000.  With the same tax rate, this tax bill 
would be $1,250, an increase in tax liability of 25.00 percent, suggesting that another property tax limit would need 
to be imposed to guarantee relief. 
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relief from assessment caps.  Second, they may be used in unison with property tax assessment 
caps to achieve similar policy goals.  For example, revenue caps and assessment caps may be 
used to provide increased relief together, suggesting that they are complementary policy tools. 
In 1975, the state of Maryland implemented a circuit breaker program called the 
“Homeowner‟s Property Tax Credit,” which provides a tax credit to homeowners whose property 
tax bills exceed a specified percentage of their household income.
11
  Initially, the program 
provided property tax relief to relatively older homeowners, but it has broadened to include 
homeowners of all ages.  Therefore, the current circuit breakers in Maryland apply to 
homeowners of all ages and are based solely on the relationship between property tax bills and 
household income.
12
  These circuit breakers are important to consider in the empirical setup for 
the same reasons associated with the revenue caps described above. 
 
1.D Literature Review 
The thread of research that relates most to the current study examines why TELs have 
been installed.  In the prior literature, there is not a consensus regarding why TELs are enacted.  
Since most state and local jurisdictions are entitled to their own preferences for government 
structure and local policy objectives, there may be several reasons for the implementation of 
TELs.  A frequently cited reason for the rising popularity of TELs relates to the simple idea that 
residents prefer to limit or reduce the size and growth of government (Shadbegian 1996).  
However, this does not explain why TELs are almost always applied to property taxes as 
opposed to other local taxes.  Perhaps, as has been widely documented, this is because the 
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 The “Homeowner‟s Property Tax Credit” (the circuit breakers) should not be confused with the “Homestead 
Property Tax Credit” (the assessment caps). 
12
 For additional information on Maryland‟s circuit breakers, see Bowman (2006) and Baer (2003). 
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property tax is one of the least liked taxes.  This is due to the transparency of the property tax 
and the way in which the tax is collected.  Whereas an income tax is generally deducted before 
an individual receives a paycheck and a sales tax is typically paid before an individual receives 
the benefits of consuming a good or service, property taxes are often collected annually in 
relatively large amounts. The high visibility of the property tax leads to disgruntled taxpayers 
and increased debate as to whether or not local governments should implement property tax 
limits.
13
   
 A corresponding explanation offered in the literature relates to the concept that voters 
prefer to implement property tax limits rather than other TELs because residents feel as though 
the current use of the property tax within the optimal portfolio of tax instruments is not 
efficient.
14
  Therefore, increasing property tax relief may shift reliance on other local tax 
mechanisms that many citizens may feel provide a more efficient tax portfolio.
15
  Similar to this 
argument, Shadbegian and Jones (2005) find that shifting from property taxes to user charges in 
support of public goods and services could make it possible for property tax limits to increase 
local government efficiency.
16
  In fact, Hill and Shone (2009) find evidence that Maryland‟s 
assessment caps do not influence the level of property tax revenue per capita but higher levels of 
property tax relief do affect the structure of total revenues at the local level because they are 
positively associated with sources of tax revenue other than the property tax. 
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 See Haveman and Sexton (2008) for a thorough discussion on property taxpayer discontent. 
14
 See Courant et al. (1980) and Ladd and Wilson (1982) for more on this contention. 
15
 This concept is consistent with O‟Sullivan et al. (1995), who contend that voters are not dissatisfied with the size 
of local governments, but instead they aim to reform the property tax explicitly because they find it to be 
characterized differently than other local taxes (particularly the income tax, which is often more progressive than the 
property tax). 
16
 For more on this idea, see Ladd and Wilson (1982), Shadbegian (1999), and Shadbegian (2003). 
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 A final explanation presented by Anderson (2006) introduces the idea that property tax 
limits may have been imposed in order to provide homeowners with a form of insurance against 
rising property tax liabilities in the future.
17
  As Anderson (2006) argues, it may not be the case 
that residents favor the implementation of a property tax limitation per se, but they may view 
these limits as a mode of protection against the risk of rapid growth in their property tax bills.  It 
is not unusual to assume that individuals are interested in future tax liabilities, and for the 
purposes of the analysis in this study, this explanation compares favorably to a similar theory – 
that residents have demanded the establishment of property tax limits as a mechanism to protect 
themselves from something that neither they nor their elected officials can directly control – 
rapid increases in assessed values.  Since assessment caps in Maryland counties only apply to 
primary residences of owner-occupied properties, homeowners may view the assessment caps as 
a means to provide insurance against rapid increases in tax bills relative to other property 
taxpayers, such as business owners.  County residents witnessing relatively larger increases in 
assessed values will vote for elected officials who will implement assessment caps that provide 
relatively more property tax relief. 
 The only prior study to consider the magnitude of TELs was developed by Shadbegian 
(1999), who defines a dummy variable representing a “stringent” TEL if that TEL is lower than a 
specified percentage (i.e., five percent).  In this study, I improve the empirical work by taking 
advantage of  Maryland‟s county-level assessment caps, which are chosen within similar 
government structures under the same requirements (between zero and ten percent) across 
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  Additionally, in separate empirical models I measure the likelihood that a property 
tax assessment cap is binding based on a rather concise definition (where a cap is binding if the 
median homeowner receives some positive amount of property tax relief) and the actual share of 
Homestead Property Tax Credit recipients as opposed to a rather loose definition (where some 
arbitrary percentage is chosen as a breaking point between binding and non-binding tax relief). 
Finally, it is possible that there are spatial effects between neighboring counties in the 
choice of magnitude of property tax relief.  If these effects exist, they could be caused by in-
county preferences towards property tax assessment caps that are influenced by the choices made 
in other “neighboring” counties.  This concept is referred to as yardstick competition, where 
policy outcomes in one jurisdiction provide a yardstick that voters in another jurisdiction might 
want to mimic.
19
  It is also possible that counties compete for a larger tax base and attempt to 
attract more homeowners to generate additional property tax revenue by providing relatively 
higher levels of residential property tax relief.  However, the cost of supporting one child in 
public schools is typically not made up for by one household entering a county unless the 
entering household generates significant increases in tax bases and revenues with low service 
demands, suggesting that yardstick competition may be more likely to take place.
20
  This is the 
first study to examine spatial effects associated with the choice of magnitude of TELs. 
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 In Shadbegian (1999), the panel reflects data collected across many jurisdictions in the U.S., making it difficult to 
compare the types of TELs installed in different counties and making it especially difficult to determine if these 
TELs are “stringent.” 
19
 See Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) for more on strategic interactions in determining property tax rates, including 
a brief discussion on yardstick competition in this setting. 
20
 The average annual county-level education spending per pupil equaled $3,924 from 1992 through 2005 (inflation-
adjusted).  In order to fully support one child, this requires an inflation-adjusted home value of approximately 
$397,075.  However, during this time, the average inflation-adjusted home value was only $139,626 (or $257,449 
short of the necessary level to fund one child). 
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1.E Conceptual Framework 
In this section, I outline a conceptual framework that relates the choice of magnitude of 
property tax relief in Maryland to Anderson‟s (2006) insurance concept.  First, I provide a 
general discussion of the median voter process and then I link the choices made by voters 
regarding property tax relief and property tax rates to the county government officials who 
implement these choices.  Next, I summarize the control variables necessary to consider in the 
empirical analysis that follows. 
A median voter model provides a sensible place to begin because the decisions central to 
this study entail county-level government choices in a democracy setting.
21
  The median voter 
model was originally developed to represent a community‟s demand for public services.  The 
process is simple – residents cast their votes on issues and the median voter‟s preferences 
represent those of the majority of voters in that jurisdiction as long as all preferences of 
individuals within that jurisdiction are single-peaked.  The assumptions of the median voter 
model fit particularly well in this study compared to prior studies that only examine the existence 
of TELs because the choice of magnitude of Maryland‟s county-level assessment caps are 
arrayed on a single continuum.
22
 
 Previous studies typically consider TELs that are voted on by citizens on a formal 
ballot.
23
  Since the decision regarding how much property tax relief to implement is not voted on 
by citizens in Maryland, the median voter‟s preferences are reflected in the decisions made by 
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 The median voter model was first developed by Bowen (1943).  For further discussion regarding a median voter 
model in the context of TELs, see Alm and Skidmore (1999). 
22
 The formal underlying assumptions of the median voter model include the following: a) a single issue can be 
arrayed on a continuum (say from high to low); b) preferences for each individual are single-peaked, and thus 
transitivity prevails; c) all individual utility functions for the public service are well-defined; and d) individuals vote 
only on a single issue.  If these assumptions hold, the median voter cannot lose in a majority rule voting process. 
23
 See Mullins and Joyce (1996) and Joyce and Mullins (1991). 
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elected county commissioners.  The median voter framework is still appropriate in this situation 
because citizens inevitably vote on and elect the county commissioners who make decisions 
regarding property tax relief, property tax rates, and other choices.
24
 
 Voters try to minimize their tax bills while meeting their tastes for local public goods and 
services by electing government officials that closely resemble their preferences.  Since short-
term shocks may occur in the local housing market causing rapid increases in residential property 
tax bills, voters understand that there are times in which the size of the property tax base is not 
restricted.  In the absence of residential property tax relief, unexpected increases in assessed 
values may create a wedge between marginal costs for public goods and services and the 
marginal benefits.  In addition, sharply rising property tax burdens can create pressures on 
household finances by reducing liquidity.  Therefore, in efforts to maintain optimal levels of 
local public goods and services (but also protect themselves against these short-run housing 
shocks), citizens elect county officials who will implement assessment caps and property tax 
rates that represent their preferred balance between tax relief and public good provision.  
Specifically, voting residents who are also homeowners may view property tax relief that applies 
only to residential property owners as a means of insurance against increasing tax bills relative to 
non-residential property owners. 
In November of a given fiscal year, county commissioners choose an assessment cap 
associated with the preferences of the median voter that will provide insurance against rapidly 
increasing residential property tax bills but provide no insurance against increases in non-
residential bills.  Later in the fiscal year, the same county officials select a tax rate associated 
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 A model by Hettich and Winer (1988) closely relates to the theoretical concept in this study, but with more 
emphasis on government officials who maximize a support function based on the expected number of favorable 
votes. 
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with real property given two important pieces of information – the median voter‟s preferences 
for local public goods and services and the magnitude of property tax relief that was chosen back 
in November.  This process draws a nice parallel to Anderson‟s (2006) insurance story because 
the insurance mechanism is determined well before the tax rate is chosen in every fiscal year.
25
  
Each of these choice variables can be used as dependent variables to capture those county 
characteristics that are significantly associated with different magnitudes of property tax relief 
and different levels of property tax rates. 
Although this basic conceptual framework does not provide the precise specification for 
the empirical setup, it helps guide the empirical analysis.  Since the insurance provided to 
homeowners in the form of property tax relief mechanisms may be intertwined with other tax 
parameters in the form of substitutes and complements, it is necessary to consider local revenue 
sources other than the property tax.  Controlling for other local taxes and revenue sources 
provides insight regarding the role of property tax limits in an environment where multiple 
instruments are used to generate revenue.  Prior research by Shadbegian (1999) suggests that 
property tax limits may indeed decrease property tax collections but other local taxes often make 
up for this lost revenue.  Therefore, I hypothesize that in order to maintain levels of public good 
provision, counties with median voters preferring relatively high levels of property tax relief may 
choose to offset any lost revenue with increases in other local revenue sources, suggesting that 
tax parameters are generally used as substitutes with property tax relief. 
It is also necessary to consider any factors that relate to shocks in the housing market that 
may affect the median voter‟s home price.  Holding all else constant, I hypothesize that counties 
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 Although these choice variables are technically chosen at different times, they may be jointly determined for 
purposes of balancing the level of property tax relief while maintaining optimal levels of public services. 
 20 
with median voters who experience sizeable (or more frequent) shocks to the housing market 
will prefer more insurance against rapid increases in property tax bills.  Similarly, those counties 
with median voters with less housing appreciation or less frequent increases in home prices will 
likely prefer less insurance against rapid increases in property tax bills. 
The magnitude of property tax relief is also dependent upon a variety of demographic and 
political variables because these characteristics capture the median voter‟s preferences for public 
good provision, which may differ both across counties and over time.  The expected effects 
differ depending on the type of demographic or political variable being examined, so these 
hypotheses are discussed thoroughly in the sections to follow.  Additionally, policy choices in 
other neighboring counties may provide signals for which policies may work well for voters in 
the home county.  Therefore, spatial effects are also considered in the empirics.  Specific 
measures used as explanatory variables are outlined in detail in later sections of this study. 
 
1.F Empirical Strategy & Variable Descriptions 
 In this section, I introduce a set of reduced form empirical exercises that are used to test 
the research questions developed in this study.  In the first exercise, I examine the role that 
various factors play in affecting the joint choice of magnitude of the assessment caps and 
property tax rates at the county level.  I also include models that control for the censoring of the 
assessment caps since many county governments chose a cap of ten percent (the state-mandated 
maximum during the time period studied).  Next, I examine the effects of neighboring-county 
choice variables on the level of assessment caps and tax rates in the home county.  Lastly, I 
examine the role that a variety of factors play in affecting the extent to which property tax relief 
is binding to capture more than the sheer existence or magnitude of property tax relief.  These 
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last two sets of models provide the primary results for this study since they are similar to the first 
two sets of models with the inclusion of spatial effects. 
Along with the dependent variables, a variety of explanatory variables are defined in this 
section including tax parameters and local public finances aside from the property tax (testing for 
the possibility of revenue substitution), shocks to the housing market (testing the insurance 
theory discussed above), and factors that control for the demand for public goods and services.  
The variables and their basic definitions are introduced as well as hypotheses regarding the sign 
for each explanatory variable to help link the conceptual framework to the empirical structure.  
Data in this study come from several sources and Table 1.3 offers the names, definitions, and 
sources for all variables used in the empirical analysis.  In the next section, descriptive statistics 
for each of the variables used in the empirical analysis are summarized in detail. 
Dependent Variables 
Several empirical models are presented in this study with different dependent variables 
that represent a key choice variable for county voters.  In the first set of models, the dependent 
variables are equal to the magnitude of the assessment cap and the property tax rate chosen for 
each county-year observation in the panel.  The assessment caps represent the main choice 
variable of interest (and have been summarized in detail in prior sections of this study) and they 
may be jointly determined with property tax rates, making it important to consider both choice 
variables in the empirics.  In Maryland, the real property tax rate applies to all real property 
including residential and non-residential property.
26
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 After fiscal year 2000, Maryland introduced the “Truth in Taxation Act,” which raised the assessment ratio for all 
property taxes from 40.00 percent to 100.00 percent and provided an offsetting reduction in tax rates.  For the 
purposes of this study, I have corrected for this policy change such that property tax rates are comparable across 
counties and over time. 
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In the final set of models, I define two dependent variables that represent the extent to 
which property tax relief is binding.  The first variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
assessment cap in a given county-year observation is less than or equal to the nominal growth 
rate in the median home sales price of residential property; otherwise, the dependent variable 
equals zero.
27
  When equal to one, this measure suggests that the majority of homeowners 
received some positive amount of property tax relief.  To check for robustness in these results, I 
also include the actual share of homeowners receiving property tax relief via county-level 
assessment caps as a separate dependent variable. 
Explanatory Variables 
 There are three main sets of explanatory variables used in each empirical setup – tax 
parameters, shock variables to the housing market, and demand-side variables that capture 
preferences for public goods among median voters across counties.
28
  The explanatory variables 
used in all of the empirical models are generally identical because the decision maker is the same 
and the choices all have similar structures and consequences.  The assessment cap is very similar 
to the choice of the property tax rate with the exception that the cap is a form of property tax 
relief that is potentially given to residential property owners whereas the tax rate is applied to 
every non-residential property, such that all owner-occupied property owners are relieved at an 
equal rate when the tax rate is reduced. 
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 These are only “potentially” binding for several reasons.  First, the analysis in this study is at the aggregate county 
level, not at the parcel level. Also, I only look at the growth in home sales prices rather than actual assessed values.  
Lastly, these are annual growth numbers and since the same properties are only reassessed every three years, the 
annual numbers are group-specific based on which one-third of residential properties are reassessed in that given 
year. 
28
 Some of these demographic measures also relate to the county officials who ultimately determine the magnitude 
of property tax relief.  Therefore, these explanatory variables consider the classic agency issues that may occur in 
the presence of a Leviathan-type government official. 
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 Since the median voter is aware that there are alternative methods of collecting revenue 
to fund local public goods and services, various tax parameters must be considered as 
explanatory variables in each of the empirical models.  Counties in Maryland raise revenue 
through income taxes, property taxes, other local taxes, and fines/fees.  County-level 
governments also receive grants from state and federal governments.
29
  Tax parameters may be 
used as complements or substitutes with property tax assessment caps and/or property tax rates.  
For example, in counties where the majority of voters prefer to use the property tax and other 
local taxes as complementary instruments to raise revenue, increased property tax relief will be 
associated with lower tax revenue from income taxes and other local taxes.  On the other hand, if 
voters feel as though the property tax is simply too high relative to other county-level taxes, 
increased property tax relief will be associated with higher tax revenue from other sources of 
local revenue. 
 The first group of tax parameters used as explanatory variables consider complementarity 
and substitutability within the property tax.  In the first set of models, I control for the 
simultaneous choice of the assessment caps and property tax rates.  The relationship between the 
caps and the rates is unclear since county officials may simultaneously provide increased 
property tax relief by lowering both the assessment cap and the property tax rate (in which case 
they are complements) or they may use them as substitutes, providing relatively more relief to 
residential property owners through lower assessment caps (holding property tax rates constant).  
The second important measure related to the property tax is a simple dummy variable for those 
observations in which county officials implemented some form of a property tax revenue limit.  
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 The amount of grants received depends on county effort and county need.  For more on Maryland‟s state and 
federal grants and the Thornton Formula, which redistributes funding for schools, see Scafidi (2008). 
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Though these limits are relatively uncommon in Maryland, it is important to control for their 
existence since counties may use revenue limits as complements or substitutes to the dependent 
variables in all three empirical exercises.  Similarly, I control for the amount of circuit breaker 
tax relief by including the average circuit breaker credit, defined as the total inflation-adjusted 
circuit breaker tax relief granted to homeowners divided by the number of circuit breaker 
recipients. 
 To control for other local sources of revenue at the county level outside of the property 
tax, I use two more tax parameters.  The first is the effective non-property tax rate, which is 
simply the amount of local revenue generated from any source other than local property taxes 
and intergovernmental revenue divided by total personal income.  I hypothesize that the 
relationship between this measure and the dependent variables at hand are ambiguous because it 
is unclear whether median voters prefer to use other local revenue as substitutes or complements 
with assessment caps, property tax rates, and the extent to which property tax assessment caps 
are binding.  The prior literature, however, has revealed that it is more likely that these tax 
parameters are used as substitutes. 
The second non-property tax revenue measure is equal to the amount of inflation-adjusted 
intergovernmental revenue per capita received by county governments to reflect the aid that 
accrues to the median voter.  Maryland counties receive intergovernmental revenue based on the 
Thornton Formula – a formula that is designed to redistribute money to those counties that show 
tax effort but also have need for funding.  Therefore, these state and federal grants are separately 
controlled for since the amount of grant money received is not a direct choice variable for the 
home county.  I hypothesize that the relationship between intergovernmental revenue and the 
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dependent variables are ambiguous for reasons similar to those listed above regarding substitutes 
and complements. 
In accordance with the idea that property tax assessment caps offer insurance to 
homeowners by restricting growth in their tax bills, any possible shocks that might occur in the 
local housing market must be accounted for.  Again, this is the first study to examine the effects 
of these shock variables on the choice of magnitude of property tax relief.  The first measure 
used to control for potential shocks to the housing market is simply equal to the annual growth in 
the inflation-adjusted median home sales price.
30
  Although the median home sales price does 
not represent the actual assessed value, the Maryland SDAT reassesses homes based on the 
market value of recent home sales prices of similar homes in the area (SDAT 2008).  Therefore, 
the growth rate in inflation-adjusted median home sales price offers a nice control for the jump in 
the size of assessed values.  A median voter experiencing higher growth in home prices is 
expected to prefer more property tax relief (lower assessment caps) and lower property tax rates 
relative to median voters experiencing relatively low growth in home prices. 
Part of the shocks to the housing market must be captured using a measure for the amount 
of new construction taking place.  To control for this, I include the annual growth rate of new, 
privately-owned single family building permits.  A higher growth rate in permits is expected to 
be associated with less-binding property tax relief via assessment caps.  Increased growth in 
building permits is associated with fewer residential properties that are eligible to receive 
property tax relief via assessment caps since new homes cannot receive relief for one full year 
(SDAT 2008).  Therefore, counties with higher growth rates in new residential homes may be 
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 I drop the growth in inflation-adjusted median home sales prices in the models in which the dependent variable is 
a dummy variable representing whether or not the assessment caps are binding because this explanatory variable is 
highly correlated to the dependent variable at hand (based on how the dependent variable has been defined). 
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associated with a lower likelihood that assessment caps are potentially-binding for the majority 
of homeowners. 
Since new construction (captured by the growth in building permits) may not fully 
explain the transformation of commercial properties (such as apartment complexes) to residential 
properties (i.e., condominiums), I include a final shock variable equal to the annual growth in 
residential properties.  Basic supply and demand theory suggests that higher growth rates in 
residential properties – which may be caused by increased supply or increased demand for 
housing – will put ambiguous pressure on housing prices.  Therefore, it is difficult to separate the 
sequence of events, leaving ambiguity in the empirical hypotheses.  Nonetheless, it is worthwhile 
to control for the possible transformation of non-residential properties (which cannot receive 
property tax relief via assessment caps) into residential properties using the growth taxable 
residential parcels. 
Finally, I control for the demand for local public goods and services by including 
variables that relate to the preferences of the median voter.  Residents with different 
characteristics often have different preferences for the provision of public goods and services, 
which may result in dissimilar preferences for property tax relief amongst median voters across 
counties and over time.  For example, explanatory measures that represent the median wealth or 
age of the population may have a significant impact on the magnitude of property tax relief 
chosen or the likelihood that it is binding.  Political affiliations of the median voter also provide a 
valuable indication of the preferences for local public good provision. 
The first set of demographic variables used represents the share of the population in a 
county that is enrolled in k-12 public schools.  A higher share of the population enrolled in 
school is expected to be associated with preferences for less property tax relief (higher 
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assessment caps), higher property tax rates, and a lower likelihood that assessment caps are 
binding.  These hypotheses are based on the premise that median voters that value k-12 
education (such as parents with children in public schools) likely demand relatively higher levels 
of school funding compared to voters receiving fewer benefits from school funding.  Since the 
property tax is the main source of funding for public schools, these results are expected to be 
rather significant.  Similarly, I include a measure representing the share of the county population 
that is aged 65 years or older.  I expect the opposite results for this explanatory variable since 
median voters who are more likely to represent the elderly population may have a lower 
preference for public school funding and they may have liquidity constraints that are more 
binding since they are less likely to be in the workforce. 
I also include inflation-adjusted median household income on the right hand side to 
control for preferences of the median voter as they relate to income.  Survey research by Joyce 
and Mullins (1991) and Mullins and Joyce (1996) suggest that those individuals with higher 
levels of income are more likely to be in favor of TEL implementation.  Perhaps this result 
relates to the idea that median voters prefer to put less emphasis on the property tax, shifting to 
other local revenue sources.  Higher levels of income also relate to a higher base for the local 
income tax, which suggests that median voters with more income are likely to prefer increased 
property tax relief (lower assessment caps and lower property tax rates), recognizing that they 
can substitute this lost revenue with increased revenue from the local income tax. 
I include voter participation as a proxy for the level of community engagement among 
county residents.  Political preferences may also play a role in the choice of magnitude of 
property tax relief or property tax rates.  I include a measure for the share of the voting 




  I expect that median voters in counties with a higher share of the voting population 
that vote for democratic candidates are more likely to be democrats, who may be associated with 
preferences for less property tax relief and higher property tax rates since democrats typically 
have tastes for relatively more public goods and services.
32
 
 The final explanatory variable I use to control for differences in preferences for property 
tax relief is the natural log of the countywide population.  Prior literature has shown that 
jurisdictions that are relatively more populated are associated with a greater likelihood of TEL 
existence.  This is likely due to the fact that there may exist economies of scale in public service 
delivery such that local government officials can afford to provide increased property tax relief 
without jeopardizing local public good provision. 
In some model specifications I have added a fourth set of explanatory variables that 
control for the possibility of spatial effects using two separate variables that are associated with 
neighboring counties‟ assessment caps, property tax rates, and the share of homestead recipients.  
These two measures are described in detail later in this study.  Expectations are that if spatial 
effects do indeed take place (either in the form of yardstick competition or tax base competition), 
the coefficients on these estimates will be positive and significant, suggesting that median voters 
in the home county set their caps and rates either to mimic the situations taking place in 
neighboring counties (yardstick competition) or to compete for homeowners (tax base 
competition). 
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 Data for the share of democratic votes and voter participation changes by county-year observation every two years 
since presidential and gubernatorial elections each occur every four years.  These numbers still provide a fair 
comparison for democratic voters since they represent shares of the population.  Therefore, even if presidential 
elections draw greater turnout than gubernatorial elections, the denominator is always the number of total votes. 
32
 Note that the share of democratic voters and voter participation may also capture effects associated with 
preferences of local government officials. 
 29 
Empirical Strategy 
In the first set of models, the research question relates to the role that various factors play 
on the choice of magnitude of assessment caps.  Several modeling issues are associated with this 
choice.  First, the caps are jointly determined with property tax rates.  Therefore, I use a two-
stage least squares model to examine the simultaneous choice of caps and rates using equations 
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10     (2) 
where δjt represents the assessment cap in county j (j = 1, …, 24) at time t (t = 1996, …, 2006), rjt 
represents the property tax rate in county j at time t, Xk represents a Kx1 vector of tax parameters 
associated with county j at time t, Yl represents an Lx1 vector of explanatory variables that relate 
to shocks in the local housing market, Zm represents an Mx1 vector of demographic and political 
characteristics of the median voter in county j at time t, ωt and φt represent time fixed effects, 
and εjt and ejt represent well-behaved error terms. 
Since these choices are made both across counties and time, I include both time fixed 
effects and county fixed effects in the second model to evaluate the effects of the independent 
variables on the assessment caps by examining changes in the independent variables within 
groups.  In this model, the slope coefficients are constant over individual counties and over time 
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10    (4) 
where λj and ηj represent the county-specific, time-constant errors and the remaining variables 
are equivalent to those in equations (1) and (2). 
 Another potential modeling issue relates to the censoring of the assessment caps at the 
state-mandated maximum of ten percent.  Therefore, in the second set of empirical results, I use 
Tobit models to control for censoring at an upper level of ten percent.
33
  Among the censoring 
results, I begin by specifying a standard Tobit model with time fixed effects included.  Next, I 
use a random effects Tobit model to account for the use of panel data.  Finally, I run two separate 
Tobit models (first without time fixed effects and then with time fixed effects included) where I 
instrument for the explanatory variable representing the property tax rate. 
In the primary set of results, I use fixed effects panel models to regress the caps and the 
rates on the same set of explanatory variables with the addition of spatial factors.  I also use the 
same set of explanatory variables to determine the role that these factors play in the extent to 
which property tax relief is binding.  First, I examine the effects of the explanatory variables on 
the probability that the assessment cap is binding – that is, that the assessment cap is providing 
property tax relief to the majority of homeowners in a given county – using a simple fixed effects 
linear probability model.  Additionally, I use a fixed effects panel model to determine the effects 
of the explanatory measures on the share of residential homeowners who were granted property 
tax relief via county-level assessment caps. 
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 I do not censor at the lower end of zero percent because only one county (Talbot) has ever installed a zero percent 
assessment cap over the course of the panel.  On the contrary, approximately 155 county-year observations were 




For each of the dependent variables, I include additional model specifications with an 
explanatory variable that captures the possibility of spatial effects.  For dependent variables 
associated with assessment caps, this includes a measure for the neighboring counties‟ 
assessment caps and for dependent variables associated with property tax rates, this includes a 
measure for the neighboring counties‟ property tax rates.  I also include an explanatory measure 
representing the neighboring counties‟ share of Homestead Property Tax Credit recipients in the 
final set of models where the dependent variable is equal to this share of recipients in the home-
county. 
In order to account for spatial effects, I must first assign those neighboring counties that 
may influence the choices made in the home county.  Let 
 ji
itjiW  represent the neighboring 
counties‟ weighted assessment cap where Wji defines the matrix that represents which counties 
are considered neighbors.  Similarly, let 
 ji
itjirW represent the neighboring counties‟ weighted 
property tax rate.  Finally, let 
 ji
itji sW  represent the neighboring counties‟ weighted share of 
homeowners receiving property tax relief via assessment caps.
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A simple average of the bordering counties‟ choice variable offers a good starting point 
because voters in the home county are most familiar with their bordering counties due to 
commuting, cross-border shopping, media reports, etc.  Therefore, let Wji equal one if the home 
county j shares at least part of its border with county i.  This is referred to as a simple contiguity-
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 In models where the dependent variable is equal to a dummy variable for whether or not the assessment cap is 
potentially-binding, I use the weighted average of the nominal assessment caps as the explanatory variable capturing 
strategic interactions because it is not feasible to instrument an explanatory measure with a dummy variable. 
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weighted specification where the matrix is row standardized, meaning that the sum of the 
weights across a given row equals one.  Thus, the terms
 ji




itji sW are 
referred to as “Contiguity-Weighted” matrices representing the average of the neighboring 
counties‟ assessment caps, property tax rates, and shares of homestead recipients, respectively. 
Because voters may look across county borders to compare property tax bills, spatial 
effects may be more common between counties that share larger borders.  Therefore, a second 
weight matrix labeled the “Shared Border-Weighted” matrix is also included in a separate 
empirical specification for each dependent variable.  This matrix continues to define only the 
counties that share borders with the home county as neighbors, but the terms
 ji





itji sW now represent averages of the neighbors‟ assessment caps, property tax rates, and 
shares of homestead recipients with more weight placed on those neighboring counties that share 
proportionately more of the home county‟s border.  An approximation of the distance shared for 
each contiguous county border was calculated to create weights for this measure. 
 In Maryland, Howard County shares its border with six other Maryland counties, 
representing the most of any county while Garrett County shares its border with only one other 
Maryland county (Allegany County).  The majority of Maryland counties share their border with 
only two or three other Maryland counties.  These weight matrices do not account for spatial 
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 Maryland shares its border with Delaware, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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Econometric Issues 
Since property tax assessment caps and property tax rates may be determined jointly with 
some of the explanatory variables representing tax parameters and housing shock variables, 
estimation of many of these models are potentially subject to policy endogeneity.  To eliminate 
potential bias in the estimation, either an instrumental variable technique must be used or the 
independent variables can be lagged.  An appropriate instrument would require a variable that is 
significantly correlated with the potentially-endogenous explanatory variable but has no 
independent effect on the dependent variable at hand.  Since no appropriate instruments have 
been found for which data are available, these variables are lagged by one period in the empirical 
analyses in each model specification. 
The spatial characteristics of the explanatory variables used to account for strategic 
interaction effects bring about additional econometric issues (Brueckner 2003, Anselin 1999).  
Since neighboring counties may also engage in yardstick competition or tax base competition 
(similar to the home county), the explanatory measures are potentially endogenous.  This occurs 
when the dependent variable at hand is not only a function of the explanatory variables of the 
home county, but also of the explanatory variables of the neighboring counties.  Using simple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) would lead to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients if spatial lag 
dependence were ignored. 
Applying Moran‟s I-test indicates that spatial lag dependence does indeed exist for many 
county-year observations in Maryland.  Therefore, I accommodate a spatial lag model using a 
conventional instrumental variable approach to acquire consistent estimates of the parameters.  
The endogenous variable (the average neighbors‟ assessment cap, property tax rate, and share of 
homestead recipients) is instrumented by the weighted averages of the neighbor counties‟ 
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explanatory variables.  Therefore, in the first stage of these models, I regress the contiguity-
weighted dependent variable of the border counties on the weighted average independent 
variables of the border counties and these estimates are used as instruments for the explanatory 
variables that capture possible strategic interaction effects. 
Another potential problem relates to spatial error dependence, where the error terms 
across neighboring counties are correlated.  If spatial error dependence exists, the error vector is 
actually defined by the term   W  where W is the weight matrix, μ is a well-behaved 
error term, and Ω is an unknown parameter.  Testing for spatial error dependence indicates that 
some observations revealed correlations in the error terms across Maryland counties.   Although 
spatial error dependence may induce correlation in the error terms, an instrumental variable 
approach leads to consistent estimates of the coefficients (Kelejian and Prucha 1998).  Therefore, 
an instrumental variable approach (as described above) is used in this study to avoid inconsistent 





 In this section, I provide a summary of the descriptive statistics to offer some background 
on the data used in the empirical analysis.  I begin by outlining trends in residential property 
values in Maryland and show the relationship between these values and the county-level 
assessment caps.  I also note some important trends in the explanatory variables before moving 
on to the results of the empirical exercises. 
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 See Anselin (1999) for more on spatial dependence. 
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Residential Property Values in Maryland 
 Homeowners in the state of Maryland have witnessed substantial increases in property 
values over the past two decades.  As shown in Table 1.4, the average county-level increase in 
inflation-adjusted median home sales prices from 1995 to 2006 was 94.20 percent.  Even 
Allegany County, the county with the least amount of growth in property values in Maryland 
over this period, saw inflation-adjusted median home sales prices increase at a rate of 27.60 
percent.  Meanwhile, Worcester County‟s inflation-adjusted median home sales price 
skyrocketed at a rate of 174.06 percent from 1995 to 2006.  Other counties in Maryland that 
witnessed sizeable increases in inflation-adjusted median home sales prices during this time 
(over 100.00 percent) include Caroline County, Dorchester County, Queen Anne‟s County, and 
Talbot County. 
Central to this study is the fact that while property values increased in Maryland, voters 
may have used property tax assessment caps to control the growth in residential property tax 
bills.  Figure 1.1 shows the trend in the average county-level median home sales price growth 
and the trend in the average county-level assessment cap in Maryland over the years 1995-
2006.
37
  This figure illustrates that county officials may have responded to rapid growth in 
property values by providing increased property tax relief by way of implementing more 
constraining property tax assessment caps. 
 To offer further evidence that voters may have installed lower assessment caps to provide 
increased property tax relief, Table 1.5 compares the assessment caps chosen by Maryland 
county governments in 2006 to their respective annual growth in nominal median home sales 
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 Note that the average county-level median home sales price growth is in nominal terms in Figure 1.1 to give a 
better understanding of the relationship between the assessment caps and the values that determine whether or not 
these caps are potentially binding. 
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prices.  Given that twenty-two out of twenty-four Maryland counties had higher growth in 
median home sales prices compared to their assessment caps, for the median homeowner in 
91.67 percent of counties the assessment cap was potentially binding in 2006.  In 2006 only 
Garrett County and Kent County did not have potentially binding property tax assessment caps, 
suggesting that the majority of homeowners in these counties did not receive property tax relief 
via assessment caps that year. 
The numbers in Table 1.5 only apply to 2006, so it is worthwhile to show the percent 
share of Maryland counties that had potentially binding property tax assessment caps in 
Maryland for years prior to 2006.  These shares are illustrated in Figure 1.2.  Early in the time 
period studied a low percentage of counties had potentially binding assessment caps, but the 
share of counties with potentially binding assessment caps grew considerably.  In particular, 
from 2000 through 2005 the share of Maryland counties with a potentially binding assessment 
cap increased from 12.50 percent to 95.83 percent. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1.6 shows the descriptive statistics for the first year in the panel (1996), the last 
year in the panel (2006), and the entire panel (1996 – 2006) including means, standard 
deviations, minimum values, and maximum values.
38
  The assessment caps declined over the 
course of the panel while property tax rates remained relatively constant.  The average county-
level assessment cap was 7.92 percent in 1996, decreasing to 6.50 percent in 2006.  On average, 
property tax rates remained close to 1.00 percent from 1996 to 2006.  Only 4.17 percent of 
counties had potentially binding assessment caps in 1996, while 91.67 percent of counties had 
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 All dollar values in this study are inflation-adjusted with a base year of 2000.  In addition, some monetary 
variables are in per capita terms to control for differences in population.  Due to data limitations noted below Table 
1.6, some variables are not available for all years of the panel. 
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potentially binding caps in 2006.  Similarly, 12.13 percent of homeowners received property tax 
relief via assessment caps in 1996, but this measure reached 46.87 percent in 2006. 
The share of counties with a property tax revenue cap installed in 1996 was 8.33 percent 
but this number doubled by 2006.  The average inflation-adjusted circuit breaker received by a 
homeowner in 1996 was $581 and by 2006 this figure reached an average of $759.  The effective 
non-property tax rate (defined as all local tax collections from sources other than the property tax 
divided by total county personal income) increased significantly from 1.51 percent on average to 
2.00 percent, suggesting that the average county attempted to collect more revenue from tax 
sources other than the property tax over the course of the panel.  Inflation-adjusted 
intergovernmental revenue per capita, which is included to account for any state and federal aid 
received by the county‟s median voter, increased significantly from $779 to $1,110 over the 
course of the panel.  Growth in inflation adjusted median home sales prices averaged 
approximately 6.40 percent per county-year observation.  Residential properties grew by an 
average rate of 1.31 percent while the growth in new building permits for privately owned 
residential homes averaged 6.56 percent during this time.   
The share of the population enrolled in k-12 public schools and the share of the 
population aged 65 and older remained relatively constant averaging 16.17 percent and 12.96 
percent, respectively, from 1996 to 2006.  Inflation-adjusted median household income increased 
from $47,689 in 1996 to $52,202 in 2006, representing growth of about 9.46 percent.  The share 
of democratic votes, as measured by results from county-level presidential and gubernatorial 
elections, remained close to 43.83 percent over the course of the panel while voter participation 
averaged 48.38 percent.  The average county-level population increased from 212,999 to 233,989 
residents, representing growth of about 9.85 percent.  I included the descriptive statistics for 
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explanatory variables associated with neighboring counties, though these measures closely 
follow the trends of their respective dependent variables that have already been noted above. 
 
1.H Results 
The results from the empirical models are shown in Tables 1.7 through 1.10, with the 
primary results being those that examine the spatial effects of assessment caps and property tax 
rates (Table 1.9) and the extent to which property tax relief is binding (Table 1.10).  Before these 
primary results are presented, I include results associated with the joint determination of caps 
and rates in Table 1.7 and censoring models in Table 1.8. 
Assessment Caps and Property Tax Rates 
Results from the first set of empirical models in which the caps and rates are determined 
simultaneously are shown in Table 1.7.  Time fixed effects are included as explanatory variables 
in both Models (1) and (2) and the second model also includes county fixed effects.  Overall, the 
results indicate that a mix of tax parameters and demographic factors play a role in the choice of 
magnitude of property tax relief and property tax rates.  Virtually no relationship exists between 
the housing shock variables and the magnitude of assessment caps chosen.  This is likely due to 
the fact that nominal assessment caps – despite their magnitude – may not guarantee property tax 
relief and are therefore not necessarily binding.  Since many of the assessment caps are non-
binding, these results indicate that housing shocks do not play a significant role in the single 
choice of the magnitude of assessment caps, but they may still play a role in the extent to which 
property tax relief is potentially binding (which is analyzed in Table 1.10). 
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In Model (1) of Table 1.7, a one percentage point decline in the assessment cap 
(associated with providing homeowners with increased property tax relief) is associated with a 
0.08 percentage point increase in the property tax rate.  The results also indicate that the lagged 
average circuit breaker credit is positively and significantly related to the property tax rate in 
both Models (1) and (2).  Specifically, a $100 increase in the lagged average circuit breaker 
credit is associated with between a 0.04 and 0.07 percentage point increase in the property tax 
rate.  Similarly, in Model (2), counties with a property tax revenue cap are associated with higher 
property tax rates of about 0.05 percentage points.  These results suggest that property tax relief 
mechanisms in the form of assessment caps, revenue caps, and circuit breakers may be used to 
lower residential property tax burdens while increasing the overall tax rate on property, a result 
that matches well with Anderson‟s (2006) insurance concept. 
The lagged effective non-property tax rate is negatively and significantly related to the 
assessment caps in both models, suggesting that increases in this rate are associated with choices 
for increased property tax relief through lower assessment caps.  More specifically, the results 
indicate that a one percentage point increase the lagged effective non-property tax rate is 
associated with a decline in the assessment cap between 1.49 and 1.71 percentage points and a 
0.29 percentage point decrease in property tax rates.  These results may provide evidence that 
higher non-property tax burdens are associated with an increased desire to protect residential 
taxpayers from sharply rising property tax burdens, illustrating the possibility of substitutability 
among tax instruments and other revenue sources at the county level. 
There exists no significance in the relationship between the choice of magnitude of 
property tax relief and the lagged amount of intergovernmental revenue per capita.  However, a 
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$100 increase in lagged inflation-adjusted intergovernmental revenue per capita is associated 
with a 0.08 percentage point increase in property tax rates.  This result may reflect the idea that 
county governments that put forth greater “effort” via higher tax rates may receive more revenue 
per capita from state and federal grants, holding all else constant. 
Few demographic factors are significantly related to the magnitude of the assessment cap 
in Table 1.7.  An increase in the share of the county-level population enrolled in public schools is 
negatively related to the magnitude of property tax relief chosen by the median voter in both 
model specifications.  The results indicate that a one percentage point increase in this share of 
the population is associated with about a 0.45 percentage point increase in the assessment cap in 
both models.  These results suggest that voters who may value local public goods and services 
more (such as residents with children in public schools) may prefer less property tax relief in 
order to properly fund local public services such as education. 
Model (2) provides further support for this contention as the relationship between the 
share of the population aged 65 years and older and the choice of magnitude of property tax 
relief is positive and significant.  A one percentage point increase in this share of the population 
is associated with a 0.70 percentage point decline in assessment caps, suggesting that higher 
shares of residents that are older (who may not prefer to spend as much on local public education 
since they do not directly benefit from these expenditures) are associated with preferences for 
increased property tax relief. 
There are also some interesting results associated with political preferences of the voting 
population.  In Model (1), a one percentage point increase in the share of democratic votes is 
associated with a 0.13 percentage point decline in assessment caps and a 0.01 percentage point 
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decline in property tax rates.  This result suggests that residents in counties with higher shares of 
democratic voters may prefer to use the property tax less than other available revenue sources in 
the portfolio of local taxation, possibly due to the regressive nature of the property tax.  
However, once county fixed effects are controlled for in Model (2), a one percentage point 
increase in the share of democratic votes is associated with a 0.05 percentage point increase in 
the assessment cap.  Therefore, after controlling for county-specific unobservable factors, higher 
shares of democratic votes (which may be associated with preferences for fewer constraints on 
local government officials) are associated with preferences for less property tax relief. 
Finally, the results in Model (1) indicate that voter participation is negatively and 
significantly related to the magnitude of assessment caps.  A one percentage point increase in 
voter participation is associated with a 0.22 percentage point decline in assessment caps.  This 
result could indicate one of two things.  First, counties with higher levels of community 
engagement may be associated with preferences for more residential property tax relief.  Also, 
government officials who attempt to establish a Leviathan-type presence may be associated with 
installing less residential property tax relief in order to maximize government revenues when 
voter participation is low. 
Results in Table 1.8 are included to account for the possibility of upper censoring of the 
assessment caps at the state-mandated level of ten percent.
39
  These results do not differ 
significantly from the results shown in Table 1.7 (or the primary results in Tables 1.9 and 1.10) 
and therefore they are not discussed in detail.  Specifically, the main results associated with the 
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 Model (1) in Table 1.8 uses a simple Tobit model with time fixed effects while Model (2) accounts for panel 
effects by using a random effects Tobit with time fixed effects.  Models (3) and (4) both use Tobit models and 
instrument for the property tax rate with the latter model including time fixed effects.  In Models (2) through (4) of 
Table 1.8, McFadden‟s pseudo r-squared is used for a goodness of fit measure.  See Gujarati (2003) for more on this 
measure. 
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censoring models are consistent with previous findings regarding revenue substitution within the 
property tax as property tax rates and average circuit breaker credits are both negatively related 
to the choice of magnitude of assessment caps in Models (1) and (4) in Table 1.8.  The results 
also indicate that substitution across other revenue sources at the county level may exist as 
effective non-property tax rates are negatively associated with property tax relief in all four 
models of Table 1.8. 
In addition to these findings, Table 1.8 provides evidence that larger housing shock 
measures may be associated with preferences for increased property tax relief.  In all four 
models, increases in the lagged growth in residential properties are associated with lower 
assessment caps.  These results may provide evidence that counties with an increased demand for 
owner-occupied housing may experience higher levels of appreciation, increasing the benefits 
gained from insurance against rapid increases in property tax bills for homeowners. 
Similar to the previous set of models, the share of the population enrolled in public 
schools is significantly related to the choice of magnitude of property tax relief.  Increases in this 
share of the population are associated with preferences for higher assessment caps.  Also, in the 
first two models in Table 1.8, inflation-adjusted median household income is negatively and 
significantly related to the magnitude of assessment caps, suggesting that median voters with 
relatively higher levels of household income prefer more property tax relief.  These results 
correspond well with survey research by Joyce and Mullins (1991) and Mullins and Joyce (1999) 
suggesting that individual voters with higher earnings are more likely to vote in favor of 
implementing TELs.  Counties with median voters who have relatively high levels of income 
may rely on a larger income tax base to generate revenue for public goods and services, a result 
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that supports prior research regarding revenue substitution effects.  Overall, the censoring models 
provide a good robustness check and the results are similar to those in the simultaneous 
equations models (Table 1.7) and the spatial models (Tables 1.9 and 1.10). 
The primary results of this study are presented in Tables 1.9 and 1.10.  The results in 
Table 1.9 are associated with fixed effects panel models (including time fixed effects) where the 
dependent variable is equal to the magnitude of the assessment caps in Models (1) and (2) and 
the property tax rates in Models (3) and (4).  Each of these models includes a specific measure 
intended to capture the possibility of spatial effects across counties. 
Although none of the explanatory variables associated with property taxes and other 
property tax relief mechanisms are significantly related to the choice of magnitude of assessment 
caps, revenue caps and average circuit breaker tax relief are both positively and significantly 
related to property tax rates in Models (3) and (4).  Specifically, the results in both models 
suggest that counties with revenue caps installed are associated with a 0.03 percentage point 
increase in property tax rates and a $100 increase in the average circuit breaker credit is 
associated with a 0.04 percentage point increase in property tax rates.  These results provide 
further evidence that property tax rates and property tax relief mechanisms may be used 
differently to achieve separate objectives. 
Once again, the effective non-property tax rate is found to be negatively and statistically 
related to the assessment caps, indicating that residents prefer to increase residential property tax 
relief when there exist other available revenue sources (outside of the property tax) to maintain 
the provision of local public goods and services.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in 
the effective non-property tax rate is associated with a decline in the assessment cap from 
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anywhere between 1.82 and 1.90 percentage points.  Similar to the results in Table 1.7, there 
appears to be no significant relationship between the housing shock variables and the magnitude 
of property tax relief or property tax rates (though the housing shocks do affect the extent to 
which property tax relief is binding in Table 1.10 as discussed below). 
Although there exists no statistical relationship between the share of the population 
enrolled in k-12 public schools and the magnitude of residential property tax relief, the results in 
Models (1) and (2) indicate that a higher share of the population aged 65 years and older is 
associated with preferences for increased property tax relief.  A one percentage point increase in 
this share of the population is associated with a decline in the assessment caps of 0.71 percentage 
points in Model (1) and a decline of 0.69 percentage points in Model (2).  Therefore, counties 
with higher shares of relatively older residents who may have more binding liquidity constraints 
and may benefit less from public services such as education are found to prefer higher levels of 
property tax relief. 
Also, in Models (1) and (2) in Table 1.9 a $1,000 increase in inflation-adjusted median 
household income is associated with a decline in assessment caps of 0.13 percentage points.  
Similar to the findings in the censoring models, these results are consistent with prior literature 
that suggests that individuals with more income tend to prefer higher levels of property tax relief.  
In Model (2) of Table 1.9, results also indicate that a one percentage point increase in the share 
of democratic votes is associated with preferences for less tax relief via assessment caps of 0.04 
percentage points, suggesting that counties with higher shares of democratic voters may prefer to 
install fewer constraints on local government revenues. 
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There appear to be no significant spatial effects with regards to the choice of magnitude 
of property tax relief in Models (1) and (2), but Models (3) and (4) indicate that there is a 
positive and significant relationship between the home county‟s property tax rate and its 
neighbors‟ rates.  In Model (3), the results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the 
average contiguity-weighted property tax rate is associated with a 0.77 percentage point increase 
in the home county‟s property tax rate.  Similarly, in Model (4) a one percentage point increase 
in the shared border-weighted property tax rate is associated with a 0.63 percentage point 
increase in the home county‟s property tax rate.  These results provide evidence that the median 
voter in the home county may either look to neighboring counties as a gauge when choosing the 
local property tax rate or the median voter may attempt to compete for homeowners in order to 
increase the property tax base. 
Binding Assessment Caps 
In the final set of empirical models, I examine the role that the same set of explanatory 
variables play on the probability that an assessment cap is potentially binding and on the share of 
homestead recipients.  Table 1.10 presents the results of these models where the first dependent 
variable is equal to a dummy variable that represents whether or not the assessment cap is 
binding for the majority of homeowners.  The second dependent variable is equal to the share of 
homeowners that actually received some positive level of property tax relief via assessment caps.  
The results in the first two models provide no significance, likely reflecting the fact that the 
dependent variable is inferior to the measure used in Models (3) and (4).
40
  Therefore, I ignore 
the discussion of the results in Models (1) and (2). 
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 The binding assessment cap dummy variable used in Models (1) and (2) is only potentially-binding for reasons 
discussed earlier in this study.  Not only may this measure be unable to fully capture the extent to which property tax 
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In the last two models in Table 1.10, there is no statistical relationship between any of the 
fiscal parameters and the share of homestead recipients, suggesting that revenue substitution 
does not play a role in the extent to which property tax relief is binding for homeowners.  
However, the lagged growth in residential properties is positively and statistically related to the 
share of homestead recipients, suggesting that shocks to the housing market play a role in the 
extent to which property tax relief is granted.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the 
lagged growth of residential properties is associated with a 1.50 percentage point increase in the 
share of homestead recipients in Model (3) and a 1.36 percentage point increase in the share of 
homestead recipients in Model (4).  These results indicate that higher demand for owner-
occupied homes (which may lead to higher home prices) may result in a greater share of 
homeowners receiving property tax relief via assessment caps. 
Counties with higher shares of the population that are aged 65 years and older are also 
associated with greater shares of homestead recipients.  In fact, a one percentage point increase 
in this share of the population is associated with between a 4.33 and a 4.48 percentage point 
increase in the share of homestead recipients.  Similarly, counties with a higher level of median 
household income are associated with a greater share of homestead recipients – a $1,000 increase 
in inflation-adjusted median household income is associated with between a 1.07 and a 1.09 
percentage point increase in the share of homestead recipients.  Each of these results matches 
well with previous findings in this study. 
Finally, the shares of homestead recipients in neighboring counties appear be positively 
and significantly related to the share of homestead recipients in the home county.  Specifically, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
relief is binding, it also could be the case that residents prefer to provide at least some tax relief to a large share of 
homeowners.  Models (3) and (4) examine this possibility. 
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one percentage point increase in the contiguity-weighted share of homestead recipients is 
associated with a 0.53 percentage point increase in the home county share of homestead 
recipients and a one percentage point increase in the shared border-weighted share of homestead 
recipients is associated with a 0.45 percentage point increase in the home county share of 
homestead recipients.  Therefore, spatial effects may play a role in extent to which property tax 
relief is granted across counties. 
Discussion of Results 
 Overall, the results from the empirical models provide evidence of revenue substitution 
effects between TELs and property tax rates and between TELs and other local revenue sources.  
These findings support similar revenue substitution effects found in prior research by Courant et 
al. (1980) and Ladd and Wilson (1982).  Empirical findings indicate that substitutability among 
revenue sources for county-level governments is particularly present in the relationship between 
assessment caps and effective non-property tax rates.  These results indicate that increased 
property tax relief is often made up for through higher income taxes, other taxes, or fines and 
fees at the local level. 
In addition, the results indicate that housing shocks (particularly increases in the growth 
of residential properties) are associated with increased property tax relief.  County-level 
assessment caps appear to extend binding property tax relief to larger shares of homeowners in 
counties where there are relatively large shocks to the housing market through higher growth in 
residential properties, which may cause higher home appreciation.  These results not only 
support Anderson‟s (2006) insurance story, but they shed light on the importance of considering 
more than the sheer existence of TELs when analyzing the effects of property tax relief 
mechanisms. 
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 The empirical models also provide interesting results regarding the demographic 
characteristics associated with the choice variables at hand.  Counties with higher shares of the 
population enrolled in k-12 public schools are associated with preferences for lower magnitudes 
of property tax relief (higher assessment caps) and higher property tax rates.  This is likely 
associated with the fact that these individuals receive more direct benefits from local public 
services such as education, so they prefer to maintain sufficient funding for schools. 
It appears that spatial effects are present in the choice of magnitude of property tax rates 
and the share of homestead recipients.  Voters in the home county look to neighboring counties 
and choose property tax rates that are positively related to their neighbors‟ rates, suggesting the 
possibility that traditional yardstick competition is taking place across Maryland counties.  In 
addition, jurisdictions that are surrounded by counties with a relatively high share of homestead 
recipients are associated with higher levels of homestead recipients in-county, suggesting that the 




 This study has established an understanding of the choice of magnitude of property tax 
relief using panel data to examine the role that various factors play in the level of property tax 
assessment caps and property tax rates chosen in Maryland county governments.  Since caps and 
rates do not fully explain whether or not property tax relief is binding, I also study which factors 
affect the extent to which property tax relief is binding.  Maryland‟s assessment caps give county 
governments the right to determine the magnitude of local property tax relief which provides a 
natural setting to analyze these questions empirically. 
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While prior studies have only examined the existence of property tax relief, this is the 
first study to analyze the way in which fiscal parameters, housing shock patterns, and 
demographic characteristics affect the choice of magnitude of property tax relief.  In addition, 
this is the first study to examine whether an assessment cap is binding – that is, whether the 
assessment cap is actually providing property tax relief rather than simply acting as a nominal 
artifact of the local tax structure.  Perhaps most importantly, this is the first study to provide 
empirical evidence in support of Anderson‟s (2006) insurance idea that suggests homeowners 
may care to maintain local public service provision while simultaneously establishing a safety 
net against uncontrollable increases in property tax bills.  Evidence of revenue substitution 
effects in the presence of property tax limitation mechanisms further supports this contention. 
The main policy implications of this study are threefold.  First, it may be possible to 
impose constraints on some local government revenues without necessarily compromising the 
level of public goods and services.  Since county governments have several ways to generate 
revenue and taxpayers across the U.S. have shown more and more distaste for the property tax, 
property tax relief may offer a situation in which the magnitude of such relief is often associated 
with substitutions in revenue production through higher effective non-property tax rates.  
Therefore, it is possible to simultaneously provide insurance against rapidly increasing property 
tax bills without compromising the level of local public goods and services. 
 Second, shocks to the housing market matter and higher magnitudes of property tax relief 
can insure homeowners against rapid increases in residential property tax bills.  Those 
jurisdictions experiencing larger shocks to the housing market are associated with providing 
greater magnitudes of property tax relief and a greater share of recipients of property tax relief.  
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These findings may have implications for other TELs, especially in jurisdictions where voters 
have the ability to vote for the implementation of TELs at various magnitudes 
Third, this study outlines those demographic attributes associated with jurisdictions that 
install relatively high levels of property tax relief versus those jurisdictions that implement 
relatively low levels of relief.  Therefore, policymakers may now be aware of several 
demographic characteristics – such as higher shares of the population that are enrolled in public 
schools – that are typically associated with the decision to implement relatively lower 
magnitudes of property tax relief in efforts to maintain funding for local education.  
Policymakers may also understand that the possibility of spatial effects may exist, including the 
possibility of yardstick competition – where the preferences of voters in the home county are 
influenced by the choices made in other neighboring counties. 
There are several suggestions for future research that relate to the findings in this study.  
When examining TELs, it is important to consider whether or not they are binding rather than 
focusing solely on their existence or even their magnitudes.  Although parcel-level data may 
provide a better unit of examination to accurately assess the likelihood that a homeowner 
experiences binding property tax relief, this study provides the first step in analyzing factors 
associated with the extent to which property tax relief is binding.  This is also one of a few 
studies to examine multiple TELs, which illustrates the importance of addressing differences in 
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Table 1.1: Homestead Property Tax Credits
10% Assessment Cap 5% Assessment Cap 0% Assessment Cap
Assessed Value in 2004 $221,103 $221,103 $221,103
Assessed Value in 2007 $315,000 $315,000 $315,000
Overall Change in Assessed Value (2004-2007) $93,897 $93,897 $93,897
Annual Change in Assessed Value (2004-2007) $31,299 $31,299 $31,299
Taxable Assessed Value without Cap in 2007 $252,402 $252,402 $252,402
Tax Liability without Cap in 2007 $2,446 $2,446 $2,446
Taxable Assessed Value with Cap in 2007 $243,213 $232,158 $221,103
Non-Taxable Assessed Value with Cap in 2007 $9,189 $20,244 $31,299
Homestead Property Tax Credit in 2007 $89 $196 $303
Tax Liability with Cap in 2007 $2,357 $2,250 $2,142
Credit calculated based on a real property tax rate of $0.9690 per $100 of assessed value
All dollar values are nominal
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Table 1.2: Maryland's Assessment Caps
County 1992 2000 2008
Allegany 10 10 10
Anne Arundel 10 4 2
Baltimore City 4 4 4
Baltimore County 4 4 4
Calvert 0 10 10
Caroline 10 10 5
Carroll 10 10 7
Cecil 10 10 8
Charles 10 5 7
Dorchester 10 10 5
Frederick 10 10 5
Garrett 10 10 5
Harford 6 10 9
Howard 5 5 5
Kent 5 5 5
Montgomery 10 10 10
Prince George's 10 3 3
Queen Anne's 10 10 5
Saint Mary's 10 5 5
Somerset 10 10 10
Talbot 10 0 0
Washington 10 10 5
Wicomico 10 10 10
Worcester 10 10 3
Average 8.50 7.71 5.92
Source: Maryland SDAT (2008)
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Table 1.3: Variable Definitions & Source Notes
Variable Name Definition Source
Assessment Cap The limit on the annual percentage increase in taxable assessed value for owner-occupied property MD SDAT
Property Tax Rate Real property tax rate per $100 of assessed value (applies to all real property in Maryland) MD SDAT
Binding Assessment Cap Dummy variable equal to one if the assessment cap is less than the annual growth in median home sales prices Author's Calculations
Share Homestead Recipients Number of homestead recipients divided by the number of residential properties MD SDAT
Property Tax Revenue Cap Dummy variable for whether or not there exists a property tax revenue cap MD SDAT
Average Circuit Breaker Credit Total circuit breaker relief divided by the number of circuit breaker recipients MD SDAT
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate Total local income and other tax revenue divided by total personal income MD DLS
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita Inflation-adjusted state and federal intergovernmental revenue per capita MD DLS
Growth in Median Home Price Annual percentage growth in inflation-adjusted median home sales price MD SDAT
Growth in Building Permits Annual percentage growth in new, privately-owned residential housing building permits U.S. Census Bureau
Growth in Residential Properties Annual percentage growth in the number of residential properties MD SDAT
Share of Population Enrolled in School Share of total county population enrolled in public k-12 schools MD Report Card
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older Share of total county population aged 65 years or older U.S. Census Bureau
Median Household Income Inflation-adjusted median household income U.S. Census Bureau
Voter Participation Number of votes divided by the population aged 20 years and above U.S. Elections Atlas
Share of Democratic Votes Share of democratic votes in the most recent Presidential or Gubernatorial Election U.S. Elections Atlas
Natural Log of Population Natural log of the total population U.S. Census Bureau
Contiguity-Weighted Assessment Cap Average of neighbors' assessment cap Author's Calculations
Shared Border-Weighted Assessment Cap Average of neighbors' assessment cap weighted by the length of the shared border Author's Calculations
Contiguity-Weighted Property Tax Rate Average of neighbors' real property tax rate Author's Calculations
Shared Border-Weighted Property Tax Rate Average of neighbors' real property tax rate weighted by the length of the shared border Author's Calculations
Contiguity-Weighted Share Homestead Recipients Average of neighbors' share of homestead recipients Author's Calculations
Shared Border-Weighted Sh. Homestead Recipients Average of neighbors' share of homestead recipients weighted by the length of the shared border Author's Calculations
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Table 1.4: Median Home Sales Prices
County 1995 2006 Percent Change
Allegany $58,756 $74,974 27.60
Anne Arundel $153,613 $286,060 86.22
Baltimore City $67,795 $119,583 76.39
Baltimore County $127,568 $213,542 67.39
Calvert $141,180 $280,167 98.45
Caroline $90,281 $226,418 150.79
Carroll $157,172 $294,688 87.49
Cecil $112,992 $220,290 94.96
Charles $152,051 $286,146 88.19
Dorchester $79,094 $187,917 137.59
Frederick $146,890 $281,875 91.90
Garrett $68,925 $116,167 68.54
Harford $127,568 $222,083 74.09
Howard $177,575 $340,813 91.93
Kent $122,031 $210,979 72.89
Montgomery $192,087 $363,021 88.99
Prince George's $146,777 $269,063 83.31
Queen Anne's $138,980 $320,313 130.47
Saint Mary's $133,331 $250,484 87.87
Somerset $71,185 $124,623 75.07
Talbot $132,766 $314,508 136.89
Washington $107,569 $206,944 92.38
Wicomico $94,348 $167,417 77.45
Worcester $93,501 $256,250 174.06
Average $120,585 $234,763 94.20
All dollar values are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)





Table 1.5: Assessment Caps & Nominal Home Price Growth (2006) Table 4: Assessment Caps & Nominal Median Home Sales Price Growth, 2005
County Assessment Cap Median Home Sales Price Growth Binding?
Allegany 10 14.4 Binding
Anne Arundel 2 15.5 Binding
Baltimore City 4 13.4 Binding
Baltimore County 4 19.1 Binding
Calvert 10 13.5 Binding
Caroline 10 48.9 Binding
Carroll 7 16.9 Binding
Cecil 8 14.6 Binding
Charles 10 18.8 Binding
Dorchester 5 25.7 Binding
Frederick 5 17.0 Binding
Garrett 5 3.8 Non-Binding
Harford 10 13.0 Binding
Howard 5 17.4 Binding
Kent 5 2.9 Non-Binding
Montgomery 10 13.3 Binding
Prince George's 3 28.6 Binding
Queen Anne's 5 14.9 Binding
Saint Mary's 5 17.3 Binding
Somerset 10 14.0 Binding
Talbot 0 23.4 Binding
Washington 10 18.2 Binding
Wicomico 10 14.0 Binding
Worcester 3 3.4 Binding
Average 6.50 16.75 91.67% Binding





Table 1.6: Descriptive Statistics
t = 1996 (n = 24) t = 2006 (n = 24) t = 1996 - 2006 (n = 264)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Assessment Cap 7.92 3.15 0.00 10.00 6.50 3.15 0.00 10.00 7.52 3.14 0.00 10.00
Property Tax Rate 0.97 0.33 0.38 2.34 1.00 0.30 0.54 2.31 1.00 0.30 0.38 2.34
Binding Assessment Cap 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Share Homestead Recipients 12.13 12.57 1.28 42.97 46.87 20.68 7.38 76.81 15.32 19.42 0.28 76.81
Property Tax Revenue Cap 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Average Circuit Breaker Credit 580.56 177.75 290.62 925.02 759.16 184.01 440.26 1,121.77 648.48 180.69 289.29 1,121.77
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate 1.51 0.29 1.08 2.04 2.00 0.39 1.34 3.01 1.67 0.34 1.03 3.01
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita 778.97 261.94 434.01 1,570.18 1,109.97 300.17 725.62 2,015.06 973.96 319.80 434.01 2,128.81
Growth in Median Home Price -0.65 4.84 -14.35 6.06 13.10 8.87 -0.34 44.26 6.40 8.17 -14.35 44.26
Growth in Building Permits 3.00 43.21 -62.96 184.91 -21.79 22.70 -54.26 18.90 6.56 47.59 -95.43 376.09
Growth in Residential Properties 1.25 0.94 -0.10 2.92 1.92 1.38 -0.85 5.61 1.31 0.97 -0.85 6.26
Share of Population Enrolled in School 16.50 1.83 13.24 20.39 15.47 2.14 11.31 19.67 16.17 2.02 11.31 21.17
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older 12.89 4.06 7.20 20.90 13.21 4.03 8.07 22.03 12.96 3.93 7.20 22.03
Median Household Income 47,689.28 12,849.09 29,797.51 70,679.92 52,202.04 15,647.07 28,828.13 79,907.29 51,054.98 14,331.18 28,828.13 79,907.29
Share of Democratic Votes 45.46 11.24 31.89 79.34 43.78 12.86 29.33 79.30 43.83 13.15 20.37 82.57
Voter Participation 47.92 5.66 37.05 60.39 44.14 6.70 33.04 55.53 48.38 8.80 32.58 71.13
Population 212,999.40 266,639.10 18,864.00 824,793.00 233,988.60 283,103.40 19,983.00 932,131.00 224,060.90 270,818.00 18,864.00 932,131.00
Contiguity-Weighted Assessment Cap 7.67 1.93 4.00 10.00 6.40 1.89 3.00 10.00 7.40 1.97 3.00 10.00
Shared Border-Weighted Assessment Cap 7.66 2.01 4.00 10.00 6.25 1.97 3.08 10.00 7.33 2.13 3.08 10.00
Contiguity-Weighted Property Tax Rate 0.95 0.14 0.71 1.28 0.97 0.12 0.78 1.28 0.97 0.12 0.71 1.29
Shared Border-Weighted Property Tax Rate 0.95 0.15 0.69 1.41 0.98 0.13 0.76 1.43 0.97 0.13 0.69 1.44
Contiguity-Weighted Share Homestead Recipients 13.56 8.35 1.81 31.11 48.64 17.94 7.38 72.34 16.15 16.91 1.17 72.34
Shared Border-Weighted Sh. Homestead Recipients 13.57 8.82 1.79 32.68 49.31 18.27 7.38 73.02 16.09 17.07 0.92 73.02
All Dollar Values are Inflation-Adjusted (2000 Dollars)
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate data are for 1996 & 2005




Table 1.7: Empirical Results, 2SLS - Assessment Caps & Property Tax Rates
Model (1): 2SLS with TFE Model (2): 2SLS with TFE & CFE
Assessment Cap Property Tax Rate Assessment Cap Property Tax Rate
R-Sq. = 0.3201 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.4579 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.9197 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.9819 n = 264
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant 10.63244 *** -1.18506 ** 20.37444 *** -1.92018
[3.5987730] [0.5091790] [6.6671320] [2.2867040]
Assessment Cap -0.07781 *** -0.03740
[0.0265430] [0.0306246]
Property Tax Rate 1.21076 2.49061
[2.1600020] [6.7515980]
Property Tax Revenue Cap (t-1 ) -0.26159 -0.08277 -0.00789 0.05103 **
[0.6444826] [0.0589510] [0.6187093] [0.0237119]
Average Circuit Breaker Credit (t-1 ) 0.00387 0.00071 *** -0.00254 0.00035 ***
[0.0033476] [0.0002505] [0.0031713] [0.0001091]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1 ) -1.71223 ** -0.28631 *** -1.49445 ** -0.04975
[0.7660942] [0.0846977] [0.6626996] [0.0667377]
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita (t-1 ) -0.00114 0.00079 *** -0.00025 -0.00001
[0.0019836] [0.0001018] [0.0010842] [0.0000525]
Growth in Median Home Price (t-1) 0.01773 0.00349 -0.00106 0.00051
[0.0338301] [0.0029911] [0.0131313] [0.0005983]
Growth in Building Permits (t-1) -0.00420 -0.00002 0.00069 0.00009
[0.0038651] [0.0003556] [0.0014633] [0.0000777]
Growth in Residential Properties (t-1) -0.27016 -0.03014 * -0.06935 -0.00047
[0.1726864] [0.0172265] [0.0723307] [0.0039922]
Share of Population Enrolled in School 0.45279 *** 0.02587 0.43866 ** 0.00477
[0.1641713] [0.0186667] [0.1998966] [0.0115919]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older 0.20278 0.01033 -0.69616 *** -0.01622
[0.1237507] [0.0077789] [0.2382891] [0.0228210]
Median Household Income 0.00004 0.00000 -0.00007 -0.00001 *
[0.0000501] [0.0000036] [0.0000608] [0.0000049]
Share of Democratic Votes -0.12646 *** -0.00934 *** 0.04890 * 0.00204
[0.0270057] [0.0031613] [0.0269952] [0.0017755]
Voter Participation -0.21658 *** 0.01419
[0.0710599] [0.0392748]
Natural Log of Population 0.16019 *** 0.31348
[0.0274000] [0.2862519]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
2SLS - Two Stage Least Squares; TFE - Time Fixed Effects; CFE - County Fixed Effects
All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)
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Table 1.8: Empirical Results, Censoring Models - Assessment Caps
Model (1): Tobit with TFE Model (2): RE Tobit with TFE Model (3): Tobit with IV Model (4): Tobit with IV & TFE
Assessment Cap Assessment Cap Assessment Cap Assessment Cap
R-Sq. = 0.1141 n = 264 R-Sq.^ = 0.5319 n = 264 R-Sq.^ = 0.6250 n = 264 R-Sq.^ = 0.6950 n = 264
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant -14.21126 32.99315 ** 6.96358 -58.57435 **
[13.216450] [15.863500] [87.297000] [23.383710]
Property Tax Rate (t-1) -9.80527 *** -2.83359 2.67813 -34.27268 ***
[3.0477230] [4.2440150] [52.541990] [10.491250]
Property Tax Revenue Cap (t-1 ) 0.04107 0.75057 0.56150 -1.42637
[1.4387370] [1.2268600] [4.8539240] [1.6977770]
Average Circuit Breaker Credit (t-1 ) 0.01253 * -0.00876 0.00404 0.02587 ***
[0.0065976] [0.0054983] [0.0113491] [0.0092359]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1 ) -6.96461 *** -3.10915 ** -5.16222 -10.38554 ***
[1.7747570] [1.2224870] [10.777900] [2.4633440]
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita (t-1 ) 0.00572 -0.00001 -0.00353 0.02607 ***
[0.0039485] [0.0024911] [0.0303565] [0.0093077]
Growth in Median Home Price (t-1) 0.08772 0.02183 0.09762 0.14422
[0.0769439] [0.0271231] [0.1191139] [0.0885399]
Growth in Building Permits (t-1) -0.00627 0.00054 -0.00919 0.00225
[0.0076968] [0.0024908] [0.0196694] [0.0094018]
Growth in Residential Properties (t-1) -1.08126 ** -0.38448 ** -0.87833 ** -1.17195 **
[0.4172939] [0.1761096] [0.4223906] [0.4563969]
Share of Population Enrolled in School 1.39059 *** 0.75376 ** 1.44656 * 1.10180 **
[0.3931904] [0.3161501] [0.8568538] [0.4383672]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older 0.16986 -0.80983 *** 0.00197 0.54811 **
[0.2030708] [0.2937629] [0.7087554] [0.2736190]
Median Household Income -0.00015 * -0.00021 ** -0.00014 -0.00011
[0.0000858] [0.0000924] [0.0001008] [0.0000960]
Share of Democratic Votes -0.23009 *** 0.07307 -0.18501 -0.28820 ***
[0.0593672] [0.0545365] [0.1239625] [0.0703351]
Natural Log of Population 2.15575 ** -0.14979 0.23325 5.77693 ***
[0.8268283] [1.4222720] [8.5431350] [1.7519050]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
TFE - Time Fixed Effects; RE - Random Effects; IV - Instrumental Variable
^McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared
All tobit models are only censored at the upper limit of 10
All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)
 64 Table 1.9: Empirical Results, Spatial Models - Assessment Caps & Property Tax Rates
Model (1): FE OLS with IV Model (2): FE OLS with IV Model (3): FE OLS with IV Model (4): FE OLS with IV
Assessment Cap Assessment Cap Property Tax Rate Property Tax Rate
R-Sq. = 0.3014 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.3066 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.3534 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.3607 n = 264
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant -81.82870 *** -82.58699 *** 0.88792 0.78985
[28.902390] [28.303990] [0.8716052] [0.8646987]
Assessment Cap (t-1) -0.00271 -0.00240
[0.0025692] [0.0025476]
Property Tax Rate (t-1) -0.23271 -0.30103
[2.3155220] [2.3130080]
Property Tax Revenue Cap (t-1) 0.05738 0.07014 0.03406 ** 0.03422 **
[0.5754202] [0.5678819] [0.0157024] [0.0156759]
Average Circuit Breaker Credit (t-1 ) -0.00367 -0.00366 0.00037 *** 0.00036 ***
[0.0024602] [0.0024508] [0.0000676] [0.0000671]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1) -1.90078 *** -1.81698 *** 0.00394 0.00171
[0.6994374] [0.6885429] [0.0202239] [0.0204147]
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita (t-1) 0.00054 0.00053 -0.00005 -0.00004
[0.0010560] [0.0010524] [0.0000320] [0.0000318]
Growth in Median Home Price (t-1) 0.00385 0.00443 0.00009 0.00016
[0.0127501] [0.0126286] [0.0003865] [0.0003825]
Growth in Building Permits (t-1) 0.00143 0.00148 0.00000 0.00000
[0.0014289] [0.0014213] [0.0000444] [0.0000442]
Growth in Residential Properties (t-1) -0.07539 -0.07055 -0.00060 -0.00011
[0.0713510] [0.0706912] [0.0021775] [0.002146]
Share of Population Enrolled in School 0.17219 0.18418 0.00065 -0.00061
[0.2097275] [0.2082575] [0.0064868] [0.0064052]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older -0.70757 *** -0.68964 *** 0.00402 0.00580
[0.2314103] [0.2318272] [0.0069281] [0.0068984]
Median Household Income -0.00013 ** -0.00013 ** 0.00000 0.00000
[0.0000582] [0.0000579] [0.0000019] [0.0000019]
Share of Democratic Votes 0.04057 0.04209 * 0.00083 0.00073
[0.0252910] [0.0252689] [0.0007703] [0.0007636]
Natural Log of Population 9.09202 *** 9.13629 *** -0.07959 -0.05698
[2.6499350] [2.6028850] [0.0865740] [0.0849906]
Contiguity-Weighted Assessment Cap^ -0.01921
[0.2588880]
Shared Border-Weighted Assessment Cap^ -0.07810
[0.1930545]
Contiguity-Weighted Property Tax Rate^ 0.77115 ***
[0.1949994]
Shared Border-Weighted Property Tax Rate^ 0.62763 ***
[0.1734394]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
FE - Fixed Effects; OLS - Ordinary Least Squares; IV - Instrumental Variable; All models include time fixed effects
^ Spatially-weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments
All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)
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 66 Table 1.10: Empirical Results, Spatial Models - Binding Caps & Homestead Recipients
Model (1): FE OLS with IV Model (2): FE OLS with IV Model (3): FE OLS with IV Model (4): FE OLS with IV
Binding Assessment Cap Binding Assessment Cap Share Homestead Recipients Share Homestead Recipients
R-Sq. = 0.5732 n = 288 R-Sq. = 0.5729 n = 288 R-Sq. = 0.8476 n = 264 R-Sq. = 0.8397 n = 264
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant -14.10073 -14.09699 48.12851 151.60130
[9.2008880] [9.0374260] [201.07350] [213.48600]
Property Tax Rate (t-1) -0.10963 -0.13227 7.53462 1.84399
[0.7438178] [0.7441713] [16.585290] [16.840780]
Property Tax Revenue Cap (t-1) 0.13378 0.14587 -2.64850 -2.00565
[0.1973579] [0.1956585] [4.0855180] [4.2511730]
Average Circuit Breaker Credit (t-1 ) 0.00044 0.00045 0.02554 0.03206 *
[0.0007879] [0.0007869] [0.0175267] [0.0178480]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1) 0.13783 0.13696 -3.61897 -2.48253
[0.2351859] [0.2314996] [4.6258850] [4.8717390]
Intergovernmental Revenue Per Capita (t-1) 0.00027 0.00027 -0.00518 -0.00444
[0.0003453] [0.0003452] [0.0075136] [0.0076934]
Growth in Median Home Price (t-1) 0.03706 0.02189
[0.0887314] [0.0909754]
Growth in Building Permits (t-1) 0.00055 0.00055 0.01467 0.01288
[0.0004914] [0.0004906] [0.0101276] [0.0103413]
Growth in Residential Properties (t-1) -0.00035 -0.00048 1.49882 *** 1.35724 ***
[0.0242273] [0.0240784] [0.4924486] [0.5029883]
Share of Population Enrolled in School 0.04452 0.04453 6.57908 *** 6.89374 ***
[0.0678720] [0.0676916] [1.4955160] [1.5226440]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Older -0.09565 -0.09443 4.48060 *** 4.33064 ***
[0.0726170] [0.0731820] [1.6110980] [1.6499430]
Median Household Income 0.00001 0.00001 0.00107 ** 0.00109 **
[0.0000185] [0.0000185] [0.0004155] [0.0004266]
Share of Democratic Votes 0.01282 0.01291 0.20337 0.26845
[0.0083358] [0.0083685] [0.1900178] [0.1911287]
Natural Log of Population 1.17387 1.13954 -22.98958 -32.26432
[0.8455643] [0.8425639] [18.526150] [19.616870]
Contiguity-Weighted Assessment Cap^ -0.03223
[0.0956963]
Shared Border-Weighted Assessment Cap^ -0.02510
[0.0698609]
Contiguity-Weighted Share Homestead Recipients^ 0.52504 ***
[0.1456152]
Shared Border-Weighted Sh. Homestead Recipients^ 0.45124 ***
[0.1467081]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
FE - Fixed Effects; OLS - Ordinary Least Squares; IV - Instrumental Variable; All models include time fixed effects
^ Spatially-weighted explanatory variables are used as instruments
All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)
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Figure 1.1: Assessment Caps and Nominal Home Price Growth






















Assessment Cap Median Home Sales Price Growth
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Figure 1.2: Share of Counties with Binding Assessment Caps


















































 “During the real-estate boom of the first half of the decade, taxes soared for many non-
homestead property owners when local governments did not roll back rates.  Homestead property 
owners were shielded by Save Our Homes, the state‟s three percent cap on annual homestead 
assessment increases.  The resulting „tax shift‟ to non-homestead property owners was one of the 
rallying cries that brought property-tax reform to the public eye in 2006 and 2007.” 
 “Tax Plan Sets Off New Round of Debate,” Miller (2009) 
 
2.A Abstract 
Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) have become increasingly popular in the United 
States (U.S.) over the past half-century, especially in the form of property tax limits.  In many 
instances, such as Florida‟s “Save Our Homes” program or Maryland‟s “Homestead Property 
Tax Credit,” these limits only provide relief to residential homeowners.  Targeted tax relief of 
this kind may theoretically shift the relative burden of the real property tax onto owners of other 
classifications of property.  Without diminishing their preferred levels of public services, both 
homeowners and business owners may pressure government officials to provide specific relief 
mechanisms benefiting their respective group.  In order to maximize supporting votes, local 
politicians must balance the preferences of these two groups of taxpayers by setting the optimal 
level of residential tax relief without causing businesses to migrate into other jurisdictions due to 
increases in the share of non-residential property tax levies.  In this study I empirically examine 
the effects of the choice of magnitude of residential property tax relief on the levels and shares of 
taxes owed by residential and non-residential property owners.  Results indicate that counties in 
Maryland whose government officials install relatively higher levels of residential property tax 
relief are associated with significant shifts in the burden of the real property tax bills from 
residential homeowners to non-residential businesses.  These shifts could result in less economic 
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activity – including fewer jobs and lower levels of income – as mobile businesses may prefer to 
migrate to jurisdictions that install less property tax relief for homeowners. 
 
2.B Introduction 
 Over the past half century, the use of TELs has escalated across the U.S.  Most TELs 
limit property taxes and are often targeted to a specific group of property owners, such as 
residential homeowners.  In the early 1990s, Florida‟s “Save Our Homes” initiative granted tax 
breaks to owners of homestead properties by limiting the annual increase in their taxable 
assessed values.  Similarly, in Maryland in the late 1970s, a statewide program called the 
“Homestead Property Tax Credit” was installed to slow growth in property tax bills for 
residential homeowners by limiting annual growth in taxable assessed values to fifteen percent.   
Since property taxes play a key role in supporting public education and other local 
services, homeowners may vote for politicians who maintain a preferred level of local 
government spending while simultaneously providing tax relief to minimize tax bills.  Similarly, 
local business owners may view the property tax as a benefit tax, aiming to preserve government 
spending in order to keep a well-educated workforce at the local level and to provide funding for 
other local services such as well-maintained roads for the transportation of goods and services.  
However, just like homeowners, business owners prefer to minimize their tax liabilities. 
Property tax relief mechanisms targeted to specific groups – such as the assessment caps 
in Florida and Maryland – may theoretically shift the relative burden of taxes towards other 
classifications of property.  Therefore, TELs that are implemented to help protect residential 
homeowners from rapid increases in property tax bills may shift the relative burden of the tax 
onto businesses and other non-residential properties.  This shift in the burden of the property tax 
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could have serious consequences for local economic activity, as relatively mobile businesses 
may take their economic activity elsewhere, potentially leaving communities with a smaller 
property tax base, higher levels of unemployment, or less income.  Meanwhile, relatively 
immobile businesses may have to adjust to bearing a greater share of property tax burdens by 
increasing prices, lowering wages, or laying off workers. 
In this study, I empirically analyze the extent to which these shifts in the burden of the 
property tax occur in the presence of residential property tax assessment caps in Maryland.  After 
the “Homestead Property Tax Credit” program was reformed in the early 1990s, each county-
level government in Maryland was given the option to determine the magnitude of property tax 
relief for residential property owners by limiting the annual increase in taxable assessed values at 
the magnitude of their choice between zero and ten percent.  Figure 2.1 illustrates that the share 
of residential property owners receiving property tax relief via assessment caps has skyrocketed 
since the beginning of the decade – from 6.58 percent in 2001 to 58.30 percent in 2008.
41
 
In Maryland, local politicians must find a balance between providing homeowners with 
insurance against rapid increases in property tax bills via assessment caps at the cost of shifting 
the tax burden onto non-residential property owners.
42
  I model the consequences of decisions 
made by local politicians who choose the optimal level of residential property tax relief in efforts 
to maximize overall support for reelection.  Since property taxes for businesses may be viewed 
as a tax on capital, relatively mobile capital may attempt to avoid shifts in the burden of the 
property tax caused by increased residential property tax relief by moving to areas where there is 
less property tax relief granted to homeowners.  In order to maximize votes, politicians must 
                                                          
41
 All tables and figures are located at the end of this chapter in the Appendix. 
42
 See Anderson (2006) for more on the contention that TELs provide homeowners with insurance against rapid 
increases in tax bills.  Alternative perspectives regarding TELs suggest that they have been installed to either limit 
the size and growth of local governments or to improve efficiency associated with the optimal portfolio of taxation. 
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consider the consequences associated with businesses bearing a greater share of taxes when 
determining the optimal level of property tax relief for residential homeowners. 
The empirical analyses in this study are broken into three main parts, all of which use 
county-level data in Maryland over the years 1999 to 2006.  I begin by examining the effects of 
the choice of magnitude of residential property tax relief on the levels and shares of non-
residential property tax levies (simply defined as the non-residential tax base times the property 
tax rate) to determine if property tax relief for homeowners has shifted the burden of real 
property taxes onto businesses.  I also examine the effects of the extent of binding residential 
property tax relief (defined as a dummy variable equal to one if annual growth in the median 
home sales price is greater than the assessment cap) on the levels and shares of non-residential 
property tax levies since the nominal caps (particularly non-binding caps) may not fully capture 
the provision of tax relief to homeowners.  Finally, I examine the effects of the assessment caps 
(both nominal and binding as mentioned above) on the level of residential tax levies. 
Overall, results of this study indicate that higher levels of residential property tax relief 
shifted the burden of real property tax bills onto non-residential property owners.  Specifically, a 
one percentage point decline in the assessment cap is associated with an $812,597 increase in 
non-residential property tax levies and a 1.83 percentage point increase in the share of non-
residential property tax levies.  As expected, these results are more pronounced when the 
nominal assessment caps are replaced with a dummy variable equal to one only when the caps 




                                                          
43
 The empirical models in this study shed light on the legal incidence associated with targeted property tax relief for 
homeowners.  Future research should consider the economic incidence associated with these tax shifts as they may 
affect consumers through higher prices or employees through lower wages or increased layoffs. 
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This is the first study to examine the impact of property tax limits on shifts in the burden 
of the property tax in a setting where government officials within each jurisdiction determine the 
magnitude of property tax relief.  Therefore, I do not focus on how the mere existence of TELs 
affects business property tax levies.  Instead, I add to the literature further by focusing on how 
the magnitude of TELs may affect these revenues.
44
  Since I am mostly interested in how the 
distribution of the property tax has changed across classes of property, I examine the share of 
property tax revenues paid by different groups in addition to the levels of property taxes.  Finally, 
this is the first study to examine the possibility of shifts in the property tax caused by TELs in 
which the key variables change both across jurisdictions and over time. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.  First, I provide background 
information on property tax provisions and TELs at the local level.  Additionally, I include 
information on property tax trends in Maryland counties.  A review of the pertinent literature is 
followed by the conceptual framework and an explanation of the empirical strategy.  Lastly, I 
outline the empirical results, provide a general discussion of the results, and summarize the 
importance of the findings in this study. 
 
2.C Background 
In this section, I briefly introduce the types of tax provisions used by government 
officials to provide targeted tax relief to different groups of taxpayers.  Then I present stylized 
facts that relate to property classification and the presence of property tax relief from Maryland‟s 
county-level assessment caps.  In particular, I break down trends in the burdens of property tax 
                                                          
44
 The only other study in the TEL literature that has considered the magnitude of property tax relief is by 
Shadbegian (1999), who examines the effects of a “stringent TEL” (defined as a TEL that is lower than a fixed 
level) on various revenue sources, including property taxes, income taxes, and other local revenues. 
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bills by classification.  Introducing these trends will demonstrate the necessity for the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
Property Tax Provisions and TELs 
Since the first tax policy was implemented to generate revenue for the provision of local 
public goods and services, taxpayers have searched for ways to minimize, avoid, or even evade 
taxes.  Research indicates that this type of behavior does indeed exist.  Individuals and 
corporations have been found to donate money to charities to avoid taxes or migrate into other 
jurisdictions based on tax policies that are more favorable to them (Rosen and Gayer 2008). 
Politics have increasingly played a role in attempts by taxpayers to influence government 
officials to install special property tax provisions such as subsidies, tax increment financing 
(TIF), and TELs.  Subsidies in the form of tax credits are often granted to large corporations to 
provide added incentives to locate in a given jurisdiction, particularly when these corporations 
will provide job opportunities for local residents, boosting local income.  In efforts to generate 
economic activity, TIF – where a government entity issues bonds to fund investments that are 
intended to spark economic growth in blighted areas – has also become increasingly popular 
(Dye and Merriman 2000). 
This study focuses on the use of special tax provisions related to TELs, and more 
specifically, property tax limits.
45
  Since government officials must respond to voter pressures in 
order to increase the likelihood of reelection, it is often the case that homeowners receive special 
tax treatment through TELs.  Businesses and homeowners both attempt to influence government 
officials to decrease their respective tax burdens and politicians are forced to balance these 
                                                          
45
 Property tax limits include rate limits, assessment limits, revenue rollbacks, expenditure limits, and circuit 
breakers.  For more on these limits and other TELs, see the National Conference of State Legislatures (2002). 
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conflicting influences in light of the fact that each group of taxpayers provides unique benefits to 
the local economy.  Balancing the preferences of these two groups can be challenging, especially 
when many taxpayers are part of both groups.  For example, homeowners that reside in the same 
county in which they work may have opposing incentives for the support of local government 
officials – on one hand they may prefer increased residential property tax relief and on the other 
hand they may be aware that sizeable shifts in the burden of the property tax may cause their 
employer to migrate to another jurisdiction. 
 Local government officials in Maryland counties have two key choice variables that 
affect property taxpayers differently.  First, increased property tax relief through lower county-
level assessment caps only provides property tax relief to residential homeowners.  Business 
owners will oppose these residential tax credits to the extent that they result in higher tax bills for 
businesses.  The second set of parameters that government officials may turn to include relief 
valves for businesses, such as subsidies, targeted tax incentives, TIF, or other types of TELs.  
Businesses that are highly sensitive to increases in the property tax may be more likely to remain 
in counties where government officials address tax shifts from assessment caps by granting 
businesses with these relief valves.
46
  If residential property owners view special tax provisions 
for businesses to be unfair, they may vote for politicians who they believe will not implement 
policies that are advantageous to businesses.  Vote-maximizing politicians must determine the 
proper mix of these choice parameters to enhance prospects for reelection.
47
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 This activity may actually increase the likelihood and magnitude of shifts in the burden of the property tax.  
Therefore, these relief valves are important to consider.  Unfortunately, I cannot measure these relief mechanisms 
due to data limitations. 
47
 Note that lowering property tax rates provides property tax relief to all owners of property equally since there are 
no unique assessment ratios that affect classes of property differently in Maryland counties.  While lower tax rates 
may please homeowners and business owners, it comes at a high revenue cost.  Therefore, targeted relief may be a 
more pragmatic means of capturing votes and maintaining service delivery. 
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Property Taxes in Maryland 
In general, there are two groups of property taxpayers – residential property owners and 
non-residential property owners.  For the purposes of this study, residential properties are 
defined as owner-occupied residential homes and condominiums while rental parcels (i.e., 
apartments and other residential rental units) are captured in the non-residential component. In 
Maryland, the three main types of non-residential properties include agricultural, commercial, 
and industrial properties.  All properties in Maryland, including residential and non-residential 
properties are assessed at full market value.
48
  Residential parcels by far make up the largest 
portion of taxable properties, averaging of 88.50 percent for the average county over the years 
1990 to 2008.  The remaining 11.50 percent of non-residential properties are shared almost 
equivalently by agricultural properties (6.12 percent) and commercial and industrial properties 
(5.38 percent). 
Although the number of taxable properties represents almost a nine-to-one ratio of 
residential to non-residential properties, the splits between the assessable bases differ.  
Approximately 75.67 percent of the total assessable base in the average Maryland county comes 
from residential properties while the remaining 24.33 percent of the non-residential assessable 
base is split between agricultural property (5.71 percent) and commercial and industrial property 
(18.62 percent).  These assessable base figures disregard any residential property tax relief 
associated with assessment caps.
49
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 In this study, I focus only on taxable properties.  Therefore, those properties exempt from property taxation are 
not included (these properties made up about 3.41 percent of properties for the average county).  Exempt properties 
include (but are not limited to) religious, charitable, fraternal, sororal, or educational properties. 
49
 Note that Maryland has a statewide circuit breaker program.  Although this program provides relief to 
homeowners only, it is ignored in this study because it is a state funded program.  Similarly, some counties have 
installed property tax revenue caps, limiting revenue growth by a fixed percent.  Since these revenue caps affect 
residential and non-residential property owners equivalently, they are also ignored in this study. 
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To give a better indication of the trends in assessable property values across property 
classification in Maryland counties, Table 2.1 shows the inflation-adjusted per-property (i.e., per 
taxable parcel) tax levies by classification for each Maryland county in 1999 and 2008.  These 
values are calculated by taking the inflation-adjusted assessable base values by class, dividing 
them by the number of properties in the respective class, and multiplying this value by the 
property tax rate per $100 of assessed value.  Therefore, these numbers represent the average tax 
payment for each property owner.  From 1999 to 2008, residential tax bills grew by 72.42 
percent while non-residential bills grew by 57.06 percent. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the assessed values of residential properties and non-residential 
properties, along with the assessed values of residential properties after the installment of the 
assessment caps.
50
  Early on in this time period, there was little difference between the 
residential assessable base with or without property tax relief.  In fact, in 1999 this difference 
only reached $22.16 million for the average county.  However, in the second half of this time 
period, the difference in the residential assessable base began to intensify, reaching a gap of 
$4.01 billion in 2008 for the average county.  This gap is associated with approximately $38.6 
million in tax revenue that would have been generated without the implementation of county-
level assessment caps.  Meanwhile, over the ten-year time period, non-residential assessable 
bases on average grew at an annual rate of less than five percent through 2005, but then began to 
increase rapidly from 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
This growth in tax relief might have several consequences.  One obvious effect may be 
cuts in local public services.  Alternatively, in order to maintain local public services, this tax 
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 Applying the property tax rate to these figures would give the tax levies for each group.  Since the same tax rate is 
applied to each group of properties, this does not affect the shares in the current discussion. 
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relief for homeowners might be offset by increases in the share of taxes paid by non-residential 
property owners (or other local revenue sources).  Although it is evident that a greater share of 
residential property owners received tax relief from assessment caps and the levels of the 
residential tax bases were lowered significantly by the caps, property tax bills may have 
increased at different rates for different classes of property over this time period.   
These trends raise some important questions.  How does the magnitude of residential 
property tax relief chosen affect the levels of tax bills paid by residential property owners versus 
non-residential property owners?  How does the magnitude of residential property tax relief 
chosen affect the shares of property taxes paid by residential property owners versus non-
residential property owners?  Since nominal assessment caps may not capture the extent to which 
property tax relief is being granted to homeowners, do binding assessment caps affect the levels 
and shares of residential and non-residential tax levies?  In order to find proper solutions to these 
questions, econometric modeling techniques must be developed in order to hold key variables 
constant.  Before the econometric model is introduced, a review of the pertinent literature and an 
overview of the conceptual framework are presented. 
 
2.D Literature Review 
 Prior literature that relates to this study can be separated into two main groups.  First, 
there are studies that focus on the effects of TELs on the structure of local revenues and 
expenditures.  These studies investigate the entire structure of local revenue portfolios 
(comparing property taxes to income taxes and other local taxes) rather than the distribution of 
the property tax (comparing levels of residential taxes to non-residential taxes).  However, the 
link between these closely related research questions is worth discussing for some guidance in 
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the sections that follow.  Second, there are a few studies that empirically examine tax burden 
shifts in light of property tax limits.  These two groups of literature are reviewed to provide 
background for the conceptual framework and empirical analyses that follow. 
Effects of TELs on the Structure of Local Revenues 
 A considerable amount of empirical work has focused on the effects of the existence of 
TELs on local government finances.  Some studies examine the effects of the existence of a TEL 
on the levels of local revenue sources, such as property taxes, income taxes, other local taxes, 
and intergovernmental revenue received from state and federal grants.
51
  Other studies apply the 
same empirical question to the expenditure side of the budget, typically examining the effects of 
TEL existence on local education spending.
52
 
 Aside from Alm and Skidmore (1999), studies in this area of the literature provide little 
discussion regarding the conceptual framework behind the empirical setup.  Since these studies 
relate closely to well-developed theories based on the demand for public goods and services, 
extensive coverage of the theory is perhaps unnecessary.  The basic median voter model applies, 
where government officials choose appropriate levels of the choice variables to maximize a 
social utility function representing the voting population within the jurisdiction. 
In the context of these studies, the choice variables include the magnitude of local tax 
rates on property, income, and other taxes, the magnitudes of various fines and fees, and the 
determination of whether or not property tax relief is granted through the installment of a TEL.  
In essence, these variables are set to achieve some level of revenue that corresponds to the 
preferences of the median voter.  Results of these studies are straightforward.  TEL existence 
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 See Preseton and Ichniowski (1991), Mullins and Joyce (1996), Shadbegian (1998), Shadbegian (1999), Alm and 
Skidmore (1999), and Hill and Shone (2009). 
52
 See Shadbegian and Jones (2005), Shadbegian (2003), and Poterba (1997). 
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decreases the level of overall tax revenues (mainly property taxes since most TELs are formed as 
property tax limits), but these losses in tax revenues are typically offset by increases in 
intergovernmental revenues or miscellaneous revenues, including fees and fines.
53
 
Shifts in Property Tax Burdens 
 There is only one study – by Dye et al. (2006) – that bears a direct similarity to the 
application in this study.  Dye et al. (2006) investigate shifts in the burden of the property tax 
using parcel-level data to understand the effects of a property tax limit on horizontal equity.  The 
authors examine a policy change in which Cook County was the only Illinois county to install an 
optional seven percent cap on annual increases in residential property tax assessments.
54
  
Two important differences between the assessment cap in Cook County and the caps in 
Maryland counties exist.  First, counties in Illinois do not have an option regarding the 
magnitude of property tax relief to grant to homeowners – they can either install or not install the 
seven percent assessment cap.  Additionally, the assessment cap in Cook County was not 
permanent when it was adopted in 2003, suggesting that residents and government officials may 
have been uncertain regarding the future existence of similar tax relief.  Chicago was the only 
reassessment area in Cook County based on the triennial assessment process in Illinois.  The 
findings in the case of Cook County suggest that declines in the tax burden for residential 
properties as a result of the installment of a seven percent assessment cap are paid for by an 
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 Prior research by Hill and Shone (2009) has already examined the effects of the magnitudes of Maryland‟s 
county-level assessment caps on various revenue sources.  Results indicate that property tax limits in Maryland do 
not necessarily impact overall property tax revenue, suggesting that it is possible that there exist distributional shifts 
across taxpayer groups.  However, increased property tax relief is associated with higher levels of other local tax 
revenue (such as income taxes). 
54
 Other studies that research the same Cook County property tax limit include the Civic Federation (2006) and 
Houlihan (2005). 
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increase in the property taxes from non-residential property owners, including owners of 
commercial, industrial, rental, vacant, and ineligible residential properties.
55
 
The main differences in this study relative to the prior literature are threefold.  First, I 
advance the understanding of the effects of TELs on shifts in the burden of taxes by looking at 
magnitudes of property tax limits as opposed to their mere existence.  Second, I focus on the 
effects of TEL magnitude on the levels of the property tax across separate taxpayer groups 
(residential versus non-residential).  Finally, I use county-level data to examine the effects of 
property tax relief on the shares of taxes paid across jurisdictions and across time whereas Dye et 
al. (2006) are only able to examine the effects of the Cook County assessment cap for one 
jurisdiction in one year. 
 
2.E Conceptual Framework 
The theoretical approach taken in this study examines the consequences associated with a 
political equilibrium concept introduced by Hettich and Winer (1988) in which government 
officials attempt to maximize their expected political support.  This model provides a realistic 
explanation for the actions taking place in Maryland counties regarding the choice of residential 
property tax relief because it relates closely to a median voter model while recognizing the 
possible tug of war between homeowners and businesses.  While I do not estimate a structural 
model formally, this framework provides the foundation for the empirical analysis, which 
examines the consequences of a Hettich and Winer (1988) environment where targeted tax relief 
is provided to homeowners only. 
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 The Civic Federation (2006) estimates that residential property owners in Chicago received a 5.70 percent decline 
in property taxes compared to the situation in which no cap was installed.  Eligible homeowners received an 11.50 
percent reduction in their property tax bills while property tax bills increased by 4.50 percent for those residential 
property owners that were ineligible. 
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In a Hettich and Winer (1988) framework, county-elected officials in Maryland attempt 
to maximize a voter “support” function, which is equivalent to maximizing the number of 
favorable votes.  The goal of candidates and incumbent officials is to be elected in the next term 
based on decisions made in the current tenure.  County officials achieve this goal by maximizing 
the weighted sum of all votes where weights are based on the political influence of the voters at 






, where E[vi] 
represents the expected vote of individual i in the next election and Wi represents the weight 
based on some indication of political influence, such as interest group membership, personal 
wealth, or simply the size and presence of a particular taxpayer group. 
 According to the assumptions by Hettich and Winer (1988), all voters engage in the same 
taxable activity.
56
  From the voter‟s perspective, the probability that one will vote in favor of a 
particular government official is linked positively to the net economic benefit that will be gained 
if that politician were to be elected.  This net economic benefit is simply equal to the benefits 
from public goods and services less the income lost from taxation.  Therefore, government 
officials aim to maximize the following support function: 







        (1) 
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 This assumption corresponds well with this study because I focus only on property taxation, which is enforced 
across several parcels of properties where different taxpayer groups (homeowners and business owners) contribute 
to local property tax revenues.  Households consume residential property to live in while businesses consider 
property as an input to production. 
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where bi represents the benefits from public goods and services (G) and ci represents the costs 
associated with the provision of these public goods and services.  These costs can be defined as 
the product of the tax rate, ti, and the level of taxable activity, Bi, for individual i.
57
 
Government officials maximize Equation (1) over the choice variables subject to two 








          (2) 
The second constraint is voter i‟s utility-maximizing response to taxation with regards to the 
taxable activity: 






       (3) 
where xi is a set of exogenous factors that explain the nature of the related variables to the 
taxable activity (such as owner-specific characteristics of the taxable property).  Presumably, the 
quantity of the taxable activity, Bi, declines as the corresponding tax rate on that activity 
increases.  In this study, the taxable activity can be thought of as ownership of a taxable property 
(residential, non-residential, or both). 
The basic outcome of the Hettich and Winer (1988) model is that government officials 
may have the incentive to issue different tax prices to different groups of taxpayers (even within 
the same tax instrument) in order to maximize the likelihood of reelection.  In other words, 
homeowners will have a different effective property tax rate relative to businesses after 
residential tax relief has been granted.  Therefore, it is no wonder why complexity in the 
structure of modern tax codes is so prevalent.  As Hettich and Winer (1988) note, this complexity 
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 In the theoretical model proposed by Hettich and Winer (1988), the authors include a term in addition to the 
product of the tax rate and the taxable activity that represents the deadweight loss (or welfare cost) of taxation.  For 
simplicity, this welfare loss is assumed to be zero in this study. 
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is actually rational from the standpoint of the government officials.  Furthermore, this model 
supports the idea that – given shocks to the taxable activity – government officials may attempt 
to reestablish the political equilibrium accordingly by tweaking the available tax parameters to 
maximize the weighted sum of expected votes.  Therefore, government officials must be 
prepared to respond to changing economic conditions, administrative changes, and political 
influences when developing local tax systems. 
In the context of the current study, different tax prices to different groups may result in 
shifts in the burden of the property tax.  Therefore, this study aims to examine the consequences 
of implementing different tax prices to different groups of taxpayers.  In Maryland counties, the 
main choice parameter for government officials that may affect the share of taxes paid by 
residential versus non-residential property owners are the assessment caps.  If relatively more 
residential property tax relief is granted to homeowners, I hypothesize that this raises the relative 
tax price for non-residential business owners.  Of course county officials could provide relief to 
all property owners by declining the property tax rate, but this may come at a high revenue cost.  
Therefore, pressure to maintain revenues and service levels while simultaneously providing tax 
relief may result in more relief to taxpayer groups that are more likely to vote. 
 Assuming that businesses view the property tax as a benefit tax, before any residential 
property tax relief has been granted, the balance between residential bills and non-residential 
bills is in equilibrium.  Under this situation, some adverse effects may transpire if government 
officials grant property tax relief to homeowners.  Those businesses that are relatively mobile 
may flee to other jurisdictions to avoid higher tax payments, disrupting local economic activity.  
If government officials attempt to provide these businesses with other targeted relief measures in 
efforts to offset losses by convincing them to stay in-county, shifts in the relative burden of the 
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property tax may become even more pronounced.
58
  Businesses that have a greater number of 
relatively immobile factors (such as land and labor) and thus cannot flee easily may bear even 
greater levels and shares of property tax levies.  For example, businesses that produce non-
tradable goods and services, such as realtor agencies, newspapers, or dry cleaning facilities may 
witness higher tax bills.  Consequences in this situation may include higher prices for goods and 
services provided by these businesses (passing increases in the burden of the tax onto 
consumers), less income provided to current employees of these businesses, or increases in 
layoffs.  The objective in this study is to first examine the legal incidence associated with the 
assessment caps before investigating the economic incidence and the potential response of 
businesses to increased levels and shares of property tax bills. 
Although votes for government officials may only be cast by county residents, it is 
common for many voters to reside in the same county in which they work.  Therefore, it is likely 
that many resident voters may consider the effects that their vote may have on the business or 
company that they work for.  Since residents may prefer that their employers remain profitable 
such that employment prospects and personal wages are unaffected by local tax policies, votes 
may be cast in favor of politicians that support businesses, giving business owners the incentive 
to remain in their current location.  Other residents may vote for government officials who offer 
larger tax breaks for homeowners.  Each voter must consider the consequences of voting for each 
candidate in order to maximize their net economic benefits. 
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 In this study I do not include factors that capture targeted incentives for businesses (such as business-specific 
subsidies or other tax provisions) due to data limitations.  To the extent that data are available, future research 
should include these incentives to better understand the tradeoff businesses may face between bearing higher shares 
of the property tax while receiving some incentives to remain located in their current jurisdiction. 
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Linking the Conceptual Framework to the Empirics 
Since homeowners are so important to electoral support functions, the empirical 
relationship between property tax relief via assessment caps and the levels and shares of 
residential taxes paid is hypothesized to be negative, suggesting that more property tax relief for 
homeowners is associated with a lower level and share of taxes paid by residential properties.  
Similarly, I expect the opposite results regarding the effects of residential tax relief on business 
property tax bills.  However, there are other variables that may impact the shares of taxes paid by 
property classification.  The conceptual framework based on Hettich and Winer‟s (1988) model 
of political equilibrium sheds light on key sets of parameters (aside from the assessment caps) to 
consider that may affect changes in the shares of property taxes paid by classification.  Here I 
define the broad nature of these factors and in the next section I introduce the specific parameters 
used to capture these effects in the empirical analysis. 
 The first group of variables relates to the presence of non-residential property owners.  
Overall, I expect that if businesses have significant presence (through a greater number of non-
residential property owners, a greater number of workers, a greater number of relatively large 
business establishments, a greater share of employees working for manufacturing businesses, 
etc.), these parameters will be associated with a higher level and share of taxes owed by non-
residential property owners.
59
  The second set of factors relates to the presence and preferences 
of homeowners, who may have more, less, or equal influence on politicians relative to 
businesses.  I expect that if homeowners have a relatively significant presence (through a higher 
share of residential parcels, higher levels of personal income, higher home values, etc.), 
                                                          
59
 Note that some of these same variables may reflect the political costs of shifting the burden of taxes onto 
businesses.  For example, counties with a greater presence of relatively “large” businesses maybe lose more 
economic activity (fewer jobs, lower income, and higher prices) if taxes are shifted more onto these businesses. 
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homeowners may bear a higher level and share of property taxes.  The presence of both groups 
of taxpayers illustrates the necessity for the empirical analysis to control for a number of key 
variables to accurately determine the effects of property tax assessment caps in Maryland 
counties on the levels and shares of taxes paid across different classes of property. 
 
2.F Empirical Strategy and Data 
 In this section I outline the setup for the empirical analysis, including econometric 
strategies and model specifications along with definitions, sources, and summary statistics 
associated with the data.  County-level data were formed for the analysis, covering all twenty-
four counties in Maryland (including Baltimore City separately from Baltimore County) over the 
years 1999 to 2006.
60
  Throughout this section of the study, I refer to Tables 2.2 and 2.3, which 
list the names and definitions of the variables used in the empirics and the descriptive statistics 
for these variables. 
Dependent Variables 
There are several specifications for the dependent variables in this study.  The first set 
relates to non-residential property taxes.  I begin by regressing levels and shares of non-
residential tax levies on the assessment caps (along with a variety of other explanatory 
measures).  I also regress the level and share of residential tax levies on the same set of 
explanatory variables.
61
  As an alternative measure, I regress these same set of dependent 
variables on a dummy variable equal to one if the assessment cap in a given county is “binding” 
(i.e., the cap is less than the annual percent change in the nominal median home sales price). 
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 Available data for the majority of the assessable tax base only date back to 1999. 
61
 I do not report the results for the effects of the assessment caps on the share of residential taxes since these results 
are equivalent (other than the signs of the coefficients) to those empirical exercises that examine the effects of the 
caps on the share of non-residential taxes. 
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The first dependent variable, labeled as non-residential tax levies, is defined as the 
product of the inflation-adjusted non-residential tax base (in millions of dollars) and the property 
tax rate.  This measure increased from $33.6 million to $41.6 million from 1999 to 2006, an 
increase of 23.81 percent.  The second measure is the share of non-residential tax levies, defined 
as the inflation-adjusted non-residential property tax base divided by the total property tax base.  
Table 2.3 illustrates that this share has declined over the time period of this study from about 
26.05 percent to 23.84 percent.
62
 
The final two dependent variables used in this study are equivalent to the first two 
dependent variables defined above but for residential properties.  First, I define residential tax 
levies as the product of the residential property tax base (in millions of inflation-adjusted dollars) 
and the property tax rate.  In 1999, the average value for this measure equaled $96.5 million and 
by 2006 this measure reached an average of $128.2 million, an increase of 32.85 percent.  The 
final dependent variable is equal to the share of residential tax levies.  However, I do not show 
these results since they are simply the opposite of the results that show the relationship between 
the explanatory variables and the share of non-residential tax levies. 
Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variables of interest in this study are the county-level assessment 
caps, which correspond with the magnitude of property tax relief for residential property owners 
as chosen by county commissioners.  Overall, I expect that increased residential property tax 
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 To check for robustness in the results, I regress two additional dependent variables that are defined similar to 
those above but for the average non-residential property owner on the same set of explanatory variables.  I define 
the average non-residential tax levy simply as the non-residential tax levy defined above divided by the number of 
non-residential properties.  In 1999, the average value for this measure was $3,772 and by 2006 this average reached 
$4,650.  I also define another dependent variable as the average share of non-residential tax levies, defined as the 
average business owner‟s tax bill divided by the sum of the average business owner‟s tax bill and the average 
homeowner‟s tax bill.  This measure on average equaled 73.28 percent in 1999 and 71.91 percent in 2006. 
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relief (through lower assessment caps) will increase the level and share of non-residential taxes.  
The average county-level assessment cap declined from 7.71 percent to 6.50 percent from 1999 
to 2006, offering taxpayers greater tax relief.  The assessment caps vary significantly across 
counties, but there is little within-county variation in the caps over this time period.  Table 2.4 
shows the assessment caps for each county in each year of the study to provide further evidence 
that within-county variation in the assessment caps is lacking.  From 1999 to 2006, assessment 
caps in fourteen of the twenty-four counties in Maryland remained the same.  Eight county 
governments lowered their caps, one county government increased their cap, and one county 
government both increased and decreased their cap at some point during this time. 
The nominal assessment caps discussed above may not accurately depict the choice of 
magnitude of property tax relief since these caps may not be binding for a significant portion of 
homeowners.  For example, a county with a five percent assessment cap may appear to offer 
increased property tax relief relative to a county with a ten percent assessment cap, but if the 
median homeowner in either of these two counties experiences home appreciation of only two 
percent, the caps are non-binding.  Therefore, I substitute a dummy variable equal to one if the 
assessment cap is binding for the median homeowner in place of the nominal assessment caps to 
check for robustness in the results.  This variable is defined as binding if the annual growth in the 
nominal home sales price is greater than the nominal assessment cap.  The descriptive statistics 
indicate that approximately 25.00 percent of counties had a binding assessment cap in 1999 and 
by 2006 approximately 91.67 percent of counties had a binding cap. 
In order to control for the possibility of substitution effects with regards to other local 
revenue sources, I include a measure equal to the effective non-property tax rate.  This measure 
is equal to all local revenue collections aside from the property tax divided by aggregate county-
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level personal income to provide an estimate for the average non-property tax rate.  In 1999 this 
measure equaled 1.60 percent for the average county and by 2006 this measure increased to and 
average of 2.00 percent. 
Aside from assessment caps and other local revenue collections, there are several other 
explanatory variables that are used in this study.  First, I introduce the variables associated with 
the presence of non-residential property owners.  Four measures were chosen to represent the 
presence of businesses and the effects of this presence on the property tax base.  The first 
measure reflects the share of taxable non-residential properties, which equaled about 11.45 
percent for the average county in Maryland during the time period in this study.  I expect that 
higher shares of non-residential properties will be associated with a greater level and share of 
taxes owed by non-residential property owners since these properties make a greater share of the 
available taxable units. 
The next explanatory variable is equal to the number of employees in a given county.  
This measure is intended to capture the size of the working population (as opposed to the size of 
the population that resides in a given county), which is positively correlated with business 
location.  Since many workers in Maryland may commute across county lines, it is vital to 
capture these effects.  A wide distribution in the number of employees existed across counties in 
2006, with the minimum number of employees equaling 4,058 and the maximum reaching 
426,478.  On one hand I expect counties with a higher number of employees to be associated 
with higher levels and shares of non-residential taxes since workers require business properties 
to work in, raising the non-residential property tax base.  On the other hand, employees often 
reside in the same county in which they work, suggesting that counties with higher numbers of 
employees are associated with higher levels of the residential tax base as well. 
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The third variable associated with businesses is equal to the number of businesses with 
1,000 or more employees.  This variable is intended to capture the number of relatively large 
businesses, which would typically require more and higher valued non-residential properties.  
Therefore, I expect this measure to have a positive and significant effect on the level and share of 
non-residential taxes.  On the other hand, larger businesses may receive more tax breaks than 
smaller businesses since they provide more jobs and increase local personal income.  The 
descriptive statistics indicate that the average county had approximately five large businesses 
over the time period studied, but this measure varied significantly across counties.  At least one 
county had zero firms with 1,000 employees or more in 2006 while another county had 27 
businesses with 1,000 or more employees in 2006. 
Finally, I include the share of employees that work for manufacturing companies to 
capture the portion of the non-residential tax base that often provides the most significant levels 
of property tax revenue.  Manufacturing businesses often have large amounts of capital, 
requiring large parcels of property for storage.  Therefore, I expect that counties with a higher 
share of employees working for manufacturing firms as opposed to businesses in other sectors 
will be associated with a greater level and share of non-residential property taxes.  From 1999 to 
2006, approximately 10.46 percent of employees in the average county worked for a 
manufacturing firm. 
The next set of explanatory variables relates to the characteristics of the population of 
residential homeowners.  The first measure is equal to the share of the population aged 65 years 
and older, intended to capture the preferences of relatively older residents.  The descriptive 
statistics in Table 2.3 illustrate that the average county-level share of the population aged 65 
years and older equaled 12.98 percent.  Although older residents may be less likely to be affected 
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by the migration of businesses (since many of them are retired on fixed levels of income), they 
may also be more likely to own a home.  Therefore, even if this portion of the population prefers 
to shift the burden of property taxes onto businesses, it may be difficult to accomplish since 
many of these same residents are homeowners, which increases the residential property tax base. 
Next, I include inflation-adjusted median household income levels.  This measure is 
intended to capture the earnings of the residents within a given county.  In 1999, the average 
county‟s inflation-adjusted median household income was $50,862, increasing to $52,202 by 
2006.  I expect that counties with residents who have a higher inflation-adjusted median 
household income will be associated with more expensive residential properties (assuming 
homes are considered normal goods), decreasing the level and share of non-residential property 
taxes.  However, it is possible that counties with higher levels of income may rely less on the 
property tax and more on the local income tax relative to counties with lower levels of income.  
If this second explanation outweighs the first, it is possible that the effects of higher income on 
the level and share of taxes paid by groups may be ambiguous. 
The last three explanatory variables control for factors that may be out of the control of 
residents but are important determinants of the level and share of taxes paid across groups.  First, 
I include the unemployment rate – which equaled 4.38 percent for the average county from 1999 
to 2006.  This measure might capture cyclical aspects of the unemployment rate, but these effects 
on properties would be very small.  Instead, I hypothesize that this measure provides some 
indication for the demand for residential properties.  I expect that higher unemployment will be 
associated with lower levels of educational attainment and income, possibly decreasing 
homeownership, resulting in a greater level and share of non-residential property taxes. 
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Next, I include the overall population of the county to control for the size of the county in 
terms of number of residents.  The average county-level population increased from 218,938 to 
233,989 from 1999 to 2006, representing growth of about 6.87 percent.  I expect that counties 
that are more populated will be associated with greater levels of property taxes for both 
residential and non-residential property owners, while the effects of the population on the 
dependent variables will be ambiguous on the shares of taxes paid across groups.  Finally, I 
include the inflation-adjusted median home sales price to capture the value of residential 
properties from one year to the next.  The average county had an inflation-adjusted median home 
sales price of $128,140 in 1999, but this value skyrocketed to $234,764 just eight years later, 
representing an increase of 83.21 percent.  Higher home prices, which increase the residential tax 
base, are expected to be associated with a lower level and share of non-residential taxes. 
Empirical Setup 
The conceptual framework in this study indicates that the assessment caps will be 
endogenous with the dependent variables.  Equations (4) and (5) illustrate the basic specification 
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10        (5) 
where Dj represents the dependent variable associated with the level or share of tax levies for 
non-residential and residential property owners in county j, δj represents the assessment cap in 
county j, X k represents a vector of explanatory variables (described above), ωt and φt represent 
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time fixed effects, and ε j and µj represent well-behaved error terms.
63
  These equations suggest 
that assessment caps are determined based on the level and share of taxes paid by groups and 
these values are also a function of the caps. 
 
2.G Results 
 The results of this study are broken into two main components.
64
  First, the results in 
Table 2.5 show the effects of the assessment caps – both nominal and binding – along with the 
remaining explanatory variables on the levels and shares of non-residential tax levies.  I also 
discuss the results associated with the same set empirical specifications except that I define the 
dependent variables as the average levels and shares of non-residential property tax levies, 
though these results are not presented in the Appendix.  Next, the results in Table 2.6 show the 
effects of the explanatory variables on the levels and shares of residential tax levies. 
 The main results of this study focus on the effects of the assessment caps on the level and 
share of non-residential property tax levies.  As shown across the first two columns of Table 2.5 
where the level and share of non-residential tax levies are regressed on the nominal assessment 
caps, the caps are negatively and significantly related to both measures of non-residential 
property taxes.  Similarly, in column four of Table 2.5, the results indicate that counties with 
binding assessment caps are associated with higher shares of non-residential tax levies.  These 
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 The vector of explanatory variables in Equation (5), Xl, is not equivalent to the explanatory variables in equation 
(4).  This is partly to satisfy the order condition, which states that it is necessary for the number of predetermined 
variables in the system to be greater than or equal to the number of slope coefficients in the equation of interest 
(Studenmund 2001).  The explanatory variables in Equation (5) are similar to those used in Essay 1 and therefore are 
not reported in the Appendix. 
64
 Note that in each set of tables I do not present the results associated with the equations in the simultaneous 
equations model in which the assessment caps represent the dependent variables since these results are basically 
equivalent to those presented in Essay 1.  
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results confirm the expected hypotheses described above – lower assessment caps (and more 
binding assessment caps) increase the levels and shares of non-residential tax levies. 
More specifically, a one percentage point decline in the assessment cap is associated with 
an $853,020 increase in non-residential tax levies and a 1.72 percentage point increase in the 
share of non-residential tax levies.  Additionally, relative to counties without a binding 
assessment cap, counties with a binding assessment cap increase the share of non-residential tax 
levies by 3.81 percentage points.  As noted previously, these results could raise concerns 
regarding local economic activity as non-residential property owners may prefer to migrate to 
jurisdictions that do not shift the relative burden of the property tax onto businesses.
65
 
The results also indicate that the lagged effective non-property tax rate is negative and 
significantly related to the share of non-residential tax levies in Table 2.5.  A one percentage 
point increase in the effective non-property tax rate is associated with between a 4.08 and a 5.01 
percentage point decline in share of non-residential tax levies.  These results may provide 
evidence that businesses have enough political influence to successfully raise other local 
revenues by increasing income taxes or fines and fees, particularly when targeted property tax 
limits are installed to shift the relative burden of property taxes onto businesses. 
A variety of explanatory measures related to the presence of businesses are statistically 
related to the level and share of non-residential property taxes.  In the first column of Table 2.5, 
the results indicate that higher shares of taxable properties that are non-residential are associated 
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 I also ran models in which the dependent variable is equal to a measure representing the overall effective property 
tax rate for all taxable properties (defined as total property tax revenue divided by the total property tax base).  
These results indicate that the assessment caps and effective property tax rates are negatively and significantly 
related.  This finding sheds light on whether the caps are affecting the base or the rate on the left hand side in Table 
2.5.  Since the models regarding the effective property tax rate take into account the size of the tax base, the findings 
in Table 2.5 should be analyzed with caution since the caps have differing effects on nominal property tax rates and 
the effective property tax rates (see Essay 1 for more on the relationship between the caps and the nominal rates). 
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with a higher level of non-residential tax levies.  In particular, a one percentage point increase in 
the share of non-residential properties is associated with a $445,370 increase in non-residential 
tax levies.  Similarly, columns two and four illustrate that a one percentage point increase in the 
share of non-residential properties is associated with between a 0.18 and a 0.63 percentage point 
increase in the share of non-residential tax levies.  These results confirm the hypothesis that a 
larger portion of taxable non-residential parcels is associated with a larger level and share of the 
property tax owed by this group. 
The results also indicate that the number of employees in a given county has a positive 
and significant effect on the level and share of non-residential tax levies.  In particular, an 
increase of 1,000 employees is associated with an increase in non-residential tax levies between 
$247,000 and $289,000 depending on the specification of the model.  In addition, column four 
indicates that an increase of 1,000 employees is associated with 0.11 percentage point increase in 
the share of non-residential tax levies.  These results provide evidence that counties with more 
workers may be associated with a larger number of businesses, resulting in higher non-residential 
property taxes. 
Additionally, the results show that counties with more businesses with 1,000 or more 
employees are associated with a greater level of non-residential tax levies.  An increase of one 
“large” business establishment is associated with between a $1.61 million and a $2.07 million 
increase in non-residential property tax levies.  These results reiterate the results found above 
regarding the relationship between the number of employees and the level of non-residential tax 
levies.  However, column four provides evidence that large businesses may have some political 
influence with regards to the share of taxes paid by non-residential property owners as a one unit 
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increase in the number of large businesses is associated with a 0.38 percentage point decline in 
the share of non-residential tax levies. 
The final explanatory variable associated with the presence of businesses equals the share 
of employees that work in the manufacturing sector.  The results match well with the hypotheses 
noted previously in this study – counties with a higher share of employees in manufacturing 
businesses relative to other sectors are associated with higher shares of property taxes owed by 
non-residential property owners since the manufacturing sector is associated with relatively large 
amounts of capital (which may require increased property for storage).  More specifically, a one 
percentage point increase in the share of employees working for manufacturing businesses is 
associated with between a 0.28 and a 0.45 percentage point increase in the share of non-
residential property tax levies. 
A variety of explanatory variables associated with homeowners are also statistically 
related to the level and share of non-residential taxes.  The share of the population aged 65 years 
and older is negatively and significantly related to both dependent variables in Table 2.5.  In 
particular, a one percentage point increase in the share of the population aged 65 years and older 
is associated with between a $500,609 and a $638,455 decline in non-residential property tax 
levies and a 0.30 to 0.63 percentage point decline in the share of non-residential property tax 
levies.  These results suggest that counties with a higher share of the population that is 65 years 
and older (who may be more likely to be retired and/or be associated with higher levels of 
homeownership relative to other residents) are associated with lower levels and shares of non-
residential property tax levies. 
The relationship between inflation-adjusted median household income and the dependent 
variables in Table 2.5 are significant in the third and fourth columns.  A $1,000 increase in 
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inflation-adjusted median household income is associated with a $202,000 decline in non-
residential property tax levies and a 0.31 percentage point decline in the share of non-residential 
tax levies.  These results may provide evidence that individuals with more income may also 
purchase more expensive homes, possibly increasing residential taxes owed and decreasing taxes 
owed by businesses. 
The results associated with the unemployment rate match well with the hypotheses 
formed earlier in this study.  A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is 
associated with between a $1.87 million and a $2.85 million increase in non-residential tax levies 
and a 1.90 percentage point increase in the share of non-residential property tax levies.  These 
results suggest that counties with higher levels of unemployment (which may be associated with 
lower levels of homeownership since unemployed citizens are less likely to own a home) 
increase the level and share of non-residential property taxes.  The explanatory variable 
associated with population has a positive effect on the overall level of non-residential tax levies 
in columns one and three of Table 2.5, which is expected since businesses may prefer to locate 
where there is a higher demand for goods and services and a larger and more diversified labor 
force.  However, increases in population are associated with lower shares of non-residential tax 
levies, suggesting that there may be economies of scale in the provision of local public goods 
and services. 
Finally, the results in Table 2.5 associated with inflation-adjusted median home sales 
prices suggest that higher prices are associated with increases in the level and share of non-
residential property tax levies.  A $1,000 increase in the median home price is associated with 
between a $75,000 and a $99,000 increase in non-residential tax levies and a 0.03 percentage 
point increase in the share of non-residential tax levies.  These results suggest that businesses 
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may co-locate in areas where housing prices are relatively high (which may be associated with a 
greater demand for housing) and where other property values are high as well, leading to an 
increase in non-residential tax levies. 
In addition to the results presented in Table 2.5, I examine an equivalent set of models 
where the dependent variables are replaced with the average levels and shares of non-residential 
property tax levies.
66
  The results associated with the explanatory variables (particularly the 
assessment caps) are similar to those presented above, suggesting that these results are robust 
across various model specifications.  In particular, the results indicate that a one percentage point 
decline in the nominal assessment cap is associated with a $491 increase in the average non-
residential property tax levy and a 3.12 percentage point increase in the average share of non-
residential tax levies.  Similarly, counties with binding assessment caps are associated with a 
5.73 percentage point increase in the average share of non-residential property tax levies. 
I also examine an equivalent set of models where the dependent variables were replaced 
with the levels and shares of commercial and industrial property tax levies to gain a better 
understanding of the effects of the explanatory variables on a specific group of non-residential 
property owners.  Since the results are quite comparable to the baseline non-residential results, I 
do not present them in the Appendix.  Overall, the effects of the nominal assessment caps on 
commercial and industrial properties were similar to those found in Table 2.5 but with higher 
magnitudes on the coefficients.  A one percentage point decline in the nominal assessment cap is 
associated with a $2.03 million increase in commercial and industrial property tax levies.  These 
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 Note that the same set of explanatory variables were used in these models with the exception that I have removed 
the share of non-residential properties since the numerator of this variable is now part of the dependent variable. 
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results suggest that relative to agricultural and other non-residential property owners, commercial 
and industrial property owners bear an even greater share of the shift in property tax burdens 
Table 2.6 presents results associated with the effects of nominal and binding assessment 
caps on the level of residential tax levies.
67
  Since the majority of the results in Table 2.6 are 
similar to those in the previous tables (with opposite signs), I do not discuss them in detail.  The 
main explanatory variables of interest in this study provide further evidence of possible shifts in 
the relative burden of the property tax from homeowners to businesses.  In column one of Table 
2.6, the results indicate that a one percentage point decline in the nominal assessment cap is 
associated with a $5.80 million decline in residential tax levies.  Similarly, results in column two 
indicate that relative to counties with a non-binding assessment cap for the median homeowner, 
counties with binding assessment caps are associated with a $33.47 million decrease in 
residential tax levies. 
Discussion of Results 
 This study is the first of its kind to examine the effects of the choice of magnitude of 
residential property tax relief on the level and share of non-residential and residential tax levies.  
Overall, the empirical results indicate that counties with government officials who choose to 
provide homeowners with increased property tax relief through lower assessment caps are 
associated with higher levels and shares of non-residential property tax levies and lower levels 
and shares of residential property tax levies.  As expected, binding residential property tax relief 
is associated with even larger increases levels and shares of non-residential tax levies.  
Therefore, the results of this study provide evidence that residential property tax relief via 
                                                          
67
 Recall that the share of residential tax levies are not presented because they are simply the opposite of the results 
associated with the share of non-residential tax levies presented in Table 2.5. 
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county-level assessment caps in Maryland may indeed cause shifts the burden of the property tax 
from homeowners to business owners. 
The specific results from this study indicate that a one percentage point decline in the 
average county-level property tax assessment cap is associated with an $853,020 increase in non-
residential property tax levies and a 1.72 percentage point increase in the share of non-residential 
property tax levies.  Similarly, counties with binding assessment caps are associated with 
increases in the share of non-residential property tax levies of 3.81 percentage points.  These 
results match well with findings from Dye et al. (2006), who use parcel-level data and find that a 
fixed assessment cap for residential property owners in Cook County, Illinois in 2003 resulted in 
a shift in the burden of property taxes from eligible residential homeowners to non-residential 
property owners and ineligible property owners. 
 Policymakers should consider consequences associated with these results when choosing 
the magnitude of property tax relief to install for homeowners.  First, non-residential property 
owners may flee to other jurisdictions if assessment caps are set too low, further shifting taxes 
towards immobile businesses that cannot migrate.  This may cause economic activity to decline 
in the local jurisdiction.  For example, if relatively mobile companies flee as a result of shifts in 
the burden of the property tax, several jobs may be lost, resulting in lower income for some 
residents.  Additionally, for those companies that are relatively immobile, shifts in the burden of 
the property tax may result in lower wages or lay offs for employees of these businesses in order 
to make up for increases in tax payments.  Alternatively, these businesses may pass the tax 
increases onto consumers through higher prices.  Therefore, economic activity may be negatively 




 Many state and local governments in the U.S. have implemented TELs over the past fifty 
years, particularly in the form of property tax limits.  For some government entities, these 
property tax limits have been installed with the purpose of providing tax relief to a targeted 
group of taxpayers.  Florida‟s “Save Our Homes” program and Maryland‟s “Homestead Property 
Tax Credit” are both examples of targeted property tax relief intended to alleviate homeowners 
from rapid increases in property tax bills.  However, non-residential property owners are often 
granted little or no property tax relief such that residential property tax limits may shift the 
relative burden of property taxes onto these businesses. 
The purpose of this study is to expand the understanding of the consequences of targeted 
property tax relief by taking the first step in examining the effects of property tax assessment 
caps for homeowners on the levels and shares of taxes owed by non-residential property owners.  
This is the first study to investigate the issue of tax burden shifts across property classes in a 
setting where there exist varying magnitudes of property tax relief across jurisdictions.  In 
addition, this is the first study to use data across jurisdictions and over time to analyze these 
research questions.  Using county-level data in Maryland over the years 1999 to 2006, I find that 
increased residential property tax relief through lower assessment caps increases the level and 
share of non-residential tax levies considerably.  These results match well with findings in a 
previous study regarding an assessment cap installed in Cook County, Illinois in 2003. 
 Several policy implications may stem from this work.  First, if businesses are mobile, 
they could migrate to other jurisdictions in order to avoid increases in taxes owed, which may 
negatively affect economic activity by way of fewer jobs or less income.  If a significant number 
of businesses flee, this further increases the shift in the burden of taxes paid by non-residential 
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property owners as there are fewer non-residential taxable parcels to support this portion of the 
tax base.  Therefore, those businesses that are relatively immobile may need to cut wages, raise 
prices, or lay off employees to maintain economic profits in the short run. 
 While these shifts in burdens of the property tax have caused a stir in many states, 
including the “Save Our Homes” program in Florida and the assessment cap installed in Cook 
County in 2003, there have been actions taken in other states to eliminate possible shifts across 
classes of property.  An interesting example of compromise between businesses and homeowners 
was established in Colorado in 1982 under the “Gallagher Amendment,” which attached fixed 
percentages to the share of state property taxes collected by property owners across different 
classifications.  Specifically, the amendment stated that 45.00 percent of all property taxes 
collected must come from residential properties while the remaining 55.00 percent must be 
collected from commercial properties (Hill et al. 2006). 
Although this study applies to Maryland counties, the findings can be useful for other 
state and local governments as well.  For example, this study provides evidence that residential 
property tax relief at higher magnitudes shifts a relatively larger portion of the property tax onto 
businesses.  In addition, the magnitude of residential property tax relief may not capture the 
effects of property tax limits on levels or shares of taxes owed across property classification 
since it is possible that many nominal assessment caps are non-binding.  Therefore, state and 
local government entities should consider the magnitude and the extent to which property tax 
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Table 2.1: Property Tax Levies
Residential Non-Residential Agricultural Commercial & Industrial
1999 2008 Growth 1999 2008 Growth 1999 2008 Growth 1999 2008 Growth
Allegany $427 $531 24.49% $1,435 $1,523 6.14% $454 $595 30.89% $1,885 $1,932 2.48%
Anne Arudel $1,360 $2,479 82.27% $6,062 $10,119 66.93% $1,525 $2,724 78.57% $7,050 $11,587 64.37%
Baltimore City $1,246 $1,983 59.14% $9,476 $11,974 26.36% $0 $0 0.00% $9,476 $11,974 26.36%
Baltimore County $1,363 $2,068 51.73% $6,830 $8,548 25.15% $1,589 $2,456 54.53% $8,382 $10,304 22.94%
Calvert $1,071 $1,966 83.61% $2,490 $5,386 116.33% $1,046 $1,713 63.73% $4,932 $7,806 58.28%
Caroline $682 $1,135 66.38% $1,055 $1,473 39.65% $734 $1,060 44.34% $2,013 $2,444 21.42%
Carroll $1,444 $2,476 71.49% $2,347 $3,532 50.52% $1,131 $1,874 65.77% $4,572 $6,043 32.17%
Cecil $883 $1,435 62.55% $2,364 $3,905 65.21% $1,398 $1,980 41.58% $3,134 $4,611 47.12%
Charles $1,137 $1,939 70.44% $3,370 $7,874 133.64% $1,108 $1,989 79.60% $5,332 $7,469 40.10%
Dorchester $531 $948 78.63% $1,060 $1,428 34.66% $620 $897 44.63% $2,175 $2,634 21.12%
Frederick $1,165 $1,947 67.14% $3,123 $7,436 138.12% $1,284 $2,229 73.61% $5,023 $8,134 61.93%
Garrett $628 $1,188 89.09% $975 $1,297 33.02% $531 $545 2.66% $1,781 $2,450 37.55%
Harford $1,291 $2,076 60.77% $4,070 $5,739 41.02% $1,465 $2,202 50.26% $6,647 $8,974 35.01%
Howard $1,820 $3,321 82.42% $9,882 $14,672 48.47% $1,849 $3,287 77.75% $12,903 $16,862 30.68%
Kent $811 $1,537 89.57% $1,962 $2,806 43.02% $1,389 $2,127 53.05% $3,057 $4,215 37.90%
Montgomery $1,889 $2,473 30.88% $14,957 $14,496 -3.08% $1,778 $2,102 18.17% $18,115 $16,932 -6.53%
Prince George's $1,164 $2,009 72.50% $6,732 $15,084 124.07% $210 $223 5.94% $7,706 $12,747 65.42%
Queen Anne's $1,121 $1,963 75.18% $1,770 $2,697 52.37% $1,309 $2,260 72.62% $2,495 $3,380 35.44%
Saint Mary's $881 $1,516 72.07% $2,162 $3,430 58.69% $1,034 $1,658 60.30% $3,753 $4,718 25.72%
Somerset $317 $680 114.21% $542 $929 71.46% $351 $555 58.07% $1,044 $1,725 65.28%
Talbot $939 $1,601 70.41% $1,730 $2,308 33.37% $1,400 $2,257 61.13% $2,108 $2,367 12.29%
Washington $845 $1,381 63.36% $3,033 $4,868 60.47% $1,071 $1,631 52.19% $4,708 $6,598 40.14%
Wicomico $600 $920 53.24% $1,456 $1,825 25.38% $465 $700 50.56% $2,525 $2,756 9.15%
Worcester $640 $1,579 146.48% $1,638 $2,921 78.37% $434 $600 38.42% $2,744 $5,003 82.32%
Average $1,011 $1,715 72.42% $3,772 $5,678 57.06% $1,007 $1,569 49.10% $5,148 $6,819 36.19%
All dollar values inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)







Table 2.2: Variable Definitions & Source Notes
Variable Name Definition Source
Non-Residential Tax Levies (millions) Non-residential property tax base multiplied by the real property tax rate MD SDAT
Share of Non-Residential Tax Levies Non-residential tax levies divided by total property tax levies MD SDAT
Residential Tax Levies (millions) Residential property tax base multiplied by the real property tax rate MD SDAT
Assessment Cap The limit on the annual percentage increase in taxable assessed value for owner-occupied property MD SDAT
Binding Assessment Cap Dummy variable equal to one if the assessment cap is less than the annual growth in median home sales prices Author's Calculations
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate Total local income and other tax revenue divided by total personal income MD DLS
Share of Non-Residential Properites Number of taxable non-residential properties divided by total taxable properties MD SDAT
Employees Number of employees U.S. Census Bureau
Large Business Establishments Number of businesses with at least 1,000 employees U.S. Census Bureau
Share of Manufacturing Employees Number of employees working for manufacturing businesses divided by the total number of employees U.S. Census Bureau
Share of Population Aged 65 & Over Number of residents aged 65 and older divided by population U.S. Census Bureau
Median Household Income Inflation-adjusted median household income U.S. Census Bureau
Unemployment Rate Number of unemployeed residents divided by the labor force Bureau of Labor Statistics
Population Total population U.S. Census Bureau
Median Home Sales Price Inflation-adjusted median home sales price MD SDAT
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
t = 1999 (n = 24) t = 2006 (n = 24) t = 1999 - 2006 (n = 192)
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Non-Residential Tax Levies (millions) 33.63 47.34 1.80 160.48 41.55 56.24 2.50 209.55 36.84 49.91 1.77 209.55
Share of Non-Residential Tax Levies 26.05 5.81 12.27 35.02 23.84 5.56 10.23 34.12 25.40 5.87 10.23 36.69
Residential Tax Levies (millions) 96.50 130.75 3.78 516.01 128.21 167.48 6.51 712.84 108.07 141.72 3.77 712.84
Assessment Cap 7.71 3.17 0.00 10.00 6.50 3.15 0.00 10.00 7.42 3.15 0.00 10.00
Binding Assessment Cap 0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate 1.60 0.28 1.13 2.20 2.00 0.39 1.34 3.01 1.73 0.35 1.03 3.01
Share of Non-Residential Properites 11.71 5.50 3.78 23.36 11.03 5.07 3.79 21.98 11.45 5.24 3.68 23.40
Employees 82,789.79 112,992.60 3,183.00 387,064.00 92,302.38 121,388.50 4,058.00 426,478.00 87,371.57 114,488.90 3,062.00 426,478.00
Large Business Establishments 4.71 8.16 0.00 28.00 4.42 7.35 0.00 27.00 4.59 7.70 0.00 31.00
Share of Manufacturing Employees 12.13 7.48 3.00 35.00 8.79 5.97 1.00 27.00 10.46 6.73 1.00 35.00
Share of Population Aged 65 & Over 12.88 3.99 7.43 20.54 13.21 4.03 8.07 22.03 12.98 3.92 7.43 22.03
Median Household Income 50,862.40 14,023.49 30,905.04 76,642.44 52,202.04 15,647.07 28,828.13 79,907.29 51,871.21 14,714.48 28,828.13 79,907.29
Unemployment Rate 4.30 2.26 1.80 9.00 4.14 1.05 2.90 6.40 4.38 1.36 1.80 9.00
Population 218,937.90 271,175.80 19,015.00 862,350.00 233,988.60 283,103.40 19,983.00 932,131.00 227,491.10 273,865.80 19,015.00 932,131.00
Median Home Sales Price 128,139.90 37,195.75 62,016.81 194,706.90 234,763.50 75,284.41 74,974.48 363,020.80 162,609.00 64,090.87 62,000.00 363,020.80
All monetary values inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars)





Table 2.4: Maryland's Assessment Caps
County 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Allegany 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Anne Arundel 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2
Baltimore City 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Baltimore County 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Calvert 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Caroline 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Carroll 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 7
Cecil 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 8
Charles 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10
Dorchester 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
Frederick 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
Garrett 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5
Harford 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Howard 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Kent 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Montgomery 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Prince George's 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3
Queen Anne's 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5
Saint Mary's 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Somerset 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Talbot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Washington 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Wicomico 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Worcester 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 3
Average Cap 7.71 7.71 7.54 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.38 6.50
Source: Maryland SDAT (2008)
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Table 2.5: Empirical Results, 2SLS - Non-Residential Property Taxes
Share of Non-Res. Tax Levies Share of Non-Res. Tax Levies
R-Sq. = 0.9887 n = 192 R-Sq. = 0.2852 n = 192 R-Sq. = 0.9913 n = 192 R-Sq. = 0.7103 n = 192
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant -21.269170 ** 29.462730 *** -15.187900 ** 37.607830 ***
[8.5544400] [7.9872120] [7.2860640] [4.9339700]
Assessment Cap -0.853020 * -1.716675 ***
[0.4740074] [0.4425769]
Binding Assessment Cap 0.125434 3.810837 ***
[2.1155630] [1.4326150]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1 ) 2.039444 -4.082168 ** 1.570039 -5.014221 ***
[2.0013290] [1.8686250] [1.7417630] [1.1794850]
Share of Non-Residential Properties 0.445370 ** 0.625719 *** 0.217630 0.184168 *
[0.2162562] [0.2019166] [0.1540461] [0.1043168]
Employees 0.000247 *** 0.000027 0.000289 *** 0.000106 ***
[0.0000424] [0.0000396] [0.0000312] [0.0000211]
Large Business Establishments 2.070370 *** 0.481800 1.611060 *** -0.382332 ***
[0.3509843] [0.3277112] [0.2134098] [0.1445167]
Share of Manufacturing Employees 0.044011 0.445587 *** -0.055184 0.283102 ***
[0.1105705] [0.1032388] [0.0866293] [0.0586636]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Over -0.638455 *** -0.631519 *** -0.500609 *** -0.303772 ***
[0.2039859] [0.1904599] [0.1689734] [0.1144252]
Median Household Income 0.000027 0.000076 -0.000202 * -0.000310 ***
[0.0001747] [0.0001631] [0.0001128] [0.0000764]
Unemployment Rate 2.848228 *** 1.898561 *** 1.872177 *** -0.037942
[0.7776163] [0.7260541] [0.4889581] [0.3311122]
Population 0.000020 * -0.000016 * 0.000017 * -0.000022 ***
[0.0000104] [0.0000097] [0.0000090] [0.0000061]
Median Home Sales Price 0.000075 *** -0.000006 0.000099 *** 0.000025 *
[0.0000256] [0.0000239] [0.0000217] [0.0000147]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
All two-stage least squares (2SLS) models include time fixed effects
See Essay 1 for more on the results from the equations where the dependent variable is the assessment cap
All monetary variables are inflation-adjusted (2000 dollars); Non-Residential Tax Levies are in millions of dollars





Table 2.6: Empirical Results, 2SLS - Residential Property Taxes
Share of Residential Tax Levies
R-Sq. = 0.9723 n = 192 R-Sq. = 0.9609 n = 192
Explanatory Variable Coefficient [Std. Error] Coefficient [Std. Error]
Constant -182.349700 *** -186.197300 ***
[37.980430] [42.632180]
Assessment Cap 5.802097 ***
[2.1045220]
Binding Assessment Cap -33.467060 ***
[12.378570]
Effective Non-Property Tax Rate (t-1 ) 7.586915 10.664150
[8.8856020] [10.191390]
Share of Non-Residential Properties 1.036672 2.432033 ***
[0.9601449] [0.9013535]
Employees 0.001281 *** 0.001056 ***
[0.0001884] [0.0001823]
Large Business Establishments -2.595867 * -0.023608
[1.5583180] [1.2487020]
Share of Manufacturing Employees -0.975719 ** -0.641429
[0.4909164] [0.5068849]
Share of Population Aged 65 & Over 3.286350 *** 1.887402 *
[0.9056666] [0.9886961]
Median Household Income 0.000690 0.001564 **
[0.0007757] [0.0006599]




Median Home Sales Price 0.000271 ** 0.000271 **
[0.0001137] [0.0001272]
*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%
All two-stage least squares (2SLS) models include time fixed effects
See Essay 1 for more on the results from the equations where the dependent variable is the assessment cap





Figure 2.1: Share of Residential Properties Receiving Tax Relief













Figure 2.2: Real Property Assessable Bases
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